Central bank transparency: examining volatility in output and financial markets by Justine Wood (1255122)
  
 
CENTRAL BANK TRANSPARENCY: 
EXAMINING VOLATILITY IN OUTPUT AND FINANCIAL MARKETS 
 
BY 
 
 
Justine A. Wood 
 
 
BA, Fordham University, 2002 
 
MA, Fordham University, 2006 
 
 
DISSERTATION 
 
SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE 
OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
IN THE DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS AT FORDHAM UNIVERSITY 
NEW YORK 
 
 
SEPTEMBER, 2014 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
Table of Contents 
 
 
I. Introduction        3 
II. Literature Review on Central Banking Transparency   5 
i. Overview of  Transparency      6 
ii. Transparency as it relates to Output     23 
iii. Transparency as it relates to Financial Markets   28 
III. A Theoretical Framework       40 
i. Output Model        43 
ii. Financial Market Model      45 
iii. Methodology        47 
IV. Data Selection        55 
V. Empirical Testing and Findings      60 
i. Output Model        64 
ii. Financial Market Model      80 
iii. Additional Results       93 
VI. Summary and Concluding Remarks      102 
VII. Bibliography        104 
VIII. Appendices        113 
IX. Abstract          
X. Vita          
 
 
3 
I. Introduction 
This research takes an extensive, fresh look at central bank transparency and its effects on 
the economy. I utilize the seminal index from Dincer and Eichengreen (2013), which contains 
values of the level of central bank transparency for over 100 countries from 1998 to 2010. This 
thesis is an extension of and a contribution to Dincer and Eichengreen’s research1. 
While most of the literature focuses on inflation volatility and persistence, there have 
been a few studies examining the effects of central bank transparency on financial markets and 
even less attention paid to output. My research therefore aspires to extend the investigation of 
these two very important areas. There is no absolute consensus in the existing literature 
regarding whether or not the increase in central bank transparency since the 1990s influences 
volatility in financial markets and output. Moreover, no published research utilizes this seminal 
measure of transparency to examine the effect on financial market volatility and there has only 
been a limited investigation using this same index into output volatility in Dincer and 
Eichengreen (2007). My main objective is to further clarify transparency’s effects on both of 
these economic variables while using the aforementioned influential transparency index 
presented in Dincer and Eichengreen (2013).  
In addition to interpreting the effects on financial markets and output volatility, I pursue 
the notion that there may be an optimal level of transparency. Transparency might have a 
maximum beneficial effect followed by diminished returns if it exceeds a certain point. It is 
almost universally agreed that the original move towards greater transparency by central banks 
was a good thing – but can there be too much of a good thing? Is a certain amount of mystique a 
                                                 
1 See Dincer and Eichengreen (2007), (2009), and (2013).  
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benefit for both central banks and the economy? Is there a limit to the benefit of openness? I aim 
to investigate if there are non-linear and diminishing returns to transparency. 
One final theory I explore is whether transparency has smoothing effects in calm periods 
and volatile, panic inducing effects in times of economic turmoil. Keynes (1936), and in modern 
times Akerlof and Shiller (2009), cautioned that ‘animal spirits’ exist, for better or worse. It is 
my claim that these animal spirits, combined with too much information from central banks, can 
exacerbate times of turmoil. I will investigate specific date ranges in particular to explore 
whether there is a tendency to have greater volatility in periods of crisis.  
The idea of central bank transparency has taken on many forms and meanings. I define 
transparency as information that central banks release to the public. Eijffinger and Geraats 
(2002) identify five aspects of transparency: political, economic, procedural, policy, and 
operational transparency; I will use the same definition and qualification of transparency. While 
the main influences are Dincer and Eichengreen (2007) and Dincer and Eichengreen (2013), 
additional foundations for my research are Kydland and Prescott (1977), Barro and Gordon 
(1983), Goodfriend (1986), Geraats (2002) as well as Eijffinger and Geraats (2006).  
The remainder of this thesis is organized into five main sections. First I review all of the 
relevant literature on central bank transparency including how it relates to output and financial 
market volatility. I then expound a theoretical framework for measuring the effect of the level of 
central bank transparency on both output and financial market volatility. Following an 
illustration of the models, I will review the data utilized. In the penultimate section I present 
empirical tests and findings. Finally, I will summarize the pertinent results and provide 
concluding remarks.  
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II. Literature Review on Central Banking 
Transparency  
 
The overwhelming contribution that the international community can make toward preventing 
crises is to succeed in encouraging sound national economic policies. And the most important 
thing that the international community can do in achieving this goal is to promote transparency. 
Summers (2000)  
 
Starting with New Zealand in 1989, there has been a vast increase in central bank 
transparency as well as the amount of information released to the public by central banks2. One 
of the first groundbreaking papers on central bank transparency was Goodfriend (1986). The 
paper is one of the first to discuss the costs and benefits of secrecy in monetary policy and asks 
how central banks respond to increasing evidence of the importance of expectations in economic 
decision making. Goodfriend argues that there are very few circumstances where opacity would 
be desirable for a central bank. My research seeks to further explore whether transparency has an 
effect on output and financial market volatility as well as investigate if there is an optimal level 
of transparency. Using Eichengreen and Dincer’s 1998-2010 transparency index to investigate 
these matters makes the research presented here a unique and valuable contribution to the field. 
There have been numerous other relevant and significant studies. This section is divided into 
three subsections: an overview of the related transparency literature; a review of the literature on 
transparency as it relates to output; and a review of the literature as it relates to financial markets.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 See Tables 3 and 4 in Appendix. 
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i. Overview of Transparency 
Dincer and Eichengreen (2007) note that since the late 1990s a large number of central 
banks have moved towards greater transparency. The authors’ goal is to contribute new evidence 
in the area of trends in transparency, correlations, and implications of transparency. Dincer and 
Eichengreen attribute the move towards greater transparency in part to the removal of currency 
pegs and the move towards more flexible exchange rates, financial liberalization and political 
liberalization. They analyze the impact of transparency on inflation persistence and variability as 
well as output variability to a limited extent. Dincer and Eichengreen construct an index that is 
based on the components of Geraats (2002) and Eijffinger and Geraats (2006) with 15 
subindices. They find that the average transparency score rises from 3.4 in 1998 to 5.2 in 2005. 
In addition, the authors find that no central bank moves further towards opacity in the period 
reviewed, though 11 of the 100 reported no change. The study finds that transparency is greater 
in countries with more stable and developed political systems and with more developed financial 
markets. In fact, the more developed a country is, the more transparent it is. They use regression 
analysis on a cross section from 1998-2004 with all variables averaged over the period. The 
authors regress transparency on a vector of political determinants (rule of law, political stability, 
voice and accountability, and government efficiency) as well as economic determinants (per 
capital income, inflation history, the de facto exchange rate regime, and financial depth). They 
find that per capita GDP is the most robust correlate of overall transparency. Moreover, countries 
with flexible exchange rate systems also tend to be more transparent. In addition, greater 
transparency is evident in countries that rank higher in terms of rule of law, that have more stable 
political systems, have higher ratings in terms of accountability, and are more favorably regarded 
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in terms of government efficiency. Dincer and Eichengreen then pool the annual observations 
and estimate FE models, including separate intercepts for each country. They find evidence that 
more advanced countries with extremely transparent central banks cannot move much further 
towards transparency and therefore offer little variation in the data, while countries that do not 
have as much political stability or rule of law have been moving towards greater transparency. 
This analysis confirms their hypothesis that transparency is greater in countries with more stable 
and developed political systems and more developed financial markets.  
Dincer and Eichengreen (2009) update their index through 2006 and use the data to study 
the determinants and consequences of monetary policy transparency on inflation, but not output. 
The authors highlight that transparency can enhance the effectiveness of monetary policy as 
effective communication with all markets can create stabilizing effects. If market participants 
can anticipate central bank actions, they can more effectively manage expectations, which should 
mitigate disruptions when changes take place. Transparency allows central banks to 
communicate with markets more effectively. The authors illustrate a few examples when 
transparency might not be optimal. If asymmetrical information is distorting then the theory of 
second best says that removing one distortion, when there are other distortions, might not be 
welfare enhancing. The authors argue that it is easy to construct scenarios where additional 
transparency destabilizes expectations and exacerbates financial market volatility. Dincer and 
Eichengreen set out to document changes in central bank transparency, analyze the determinants 
of the degree of transparency while focusing on the function of political variables, and 
investigate consequences of monetary policy effects on inflation variability and inflation 
persistence. They do not investigate output variability in this study. Finally, the authors set out to 
provide a provisional answer to Mishkin (2004) and examine whether there are diminishing 
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returns to transparency. Dincer and Eichengreen explore optimal central bank transparency by 
adding a squared term in transparency to try and determine whether there are diminishing returns 
to transparency.  
As in Dincer and Eichengreen (2007), Dincer and Eichengreen (2009) again follow the 
work of Eijffinger and Geraats (2006) and include the same 15 subindices covering political, 
economic, procedural, policy, and operational transparency, extending Eijffinger and Geraats’ 
data set to include 100 central banks to include all large and systematically significant countries. 
They use regression analysis to examine the differences in central bank transparency across 
countries and over time in order to provide an explanation for variations and to identify 
instruments for use in the analysis of the consequences of transparency. The authors use a cross 
section from 1998-2006 of all variables averaged over the period and regress transparency on a 
vector per capita income, inflation history, the de facto exchange rate regime, financial depth, 
rule of law, political stability, voice and accountability, government efficiency, and democratic 
orientation. They find that policy transparency is significantly related to every one of their 
measures of policies and institutions and use their specification to look at trends in transparency. 
The authors pool the annual observations and estimate an FE model with separate intercepts for 
each country. Rather than looking at a cross section, the authors now look at time series variation 
in the data to see how central bank transparency is evolving over time. Utilizing instrumental 
variables (IV) and generalized method of moments (GMM), they find the main variables to 
explain the move towards greater transparency to be the move to more flexible exchange rates, 
per capita GDP, rule of law and government efficiency. Dincer and Eichengreen then turn to the 
issue of optimal central bank transparency by adding a squared term in transparency to try and 
determine whether there are diminishing returns to transparency. They estimate second-stage 
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coefficients using GMM to correct for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation present in the 
data. Their results suggest that increased transparency has the strongest effect on inflation 
variability for the most secret of central banks and they do find evidence of diminishing returns 
to transparency. As in their previous paper, the authors find transparency is more likely in 
countries with strong and stable political institutions and democracies. The authors conclude that 
increased transparency is associated with less inflation variability but not with less inflation 
persistence.  
Siklos (2011) extends the data index provided by Dincer and Eichengreen (2009) and 
examines central bank transparency. The author finds that there are significant increases to the 
level of transparency in Central and Eastern Europe compared to much smaller rises in other 
countries. Siklos concludes that it is ambiguous whether or not the additional years in the data 
demonstrate diminishing returns to transparency. Dincer and Eichengreen (2013) continue with 
Siklos’ update and extend the index up through 2010. They confirm their previous studies and 
find that there has been an increase in transparency and independence over the time period. The 
authors also confirm previous studies that conclude the variability of inflation is significantly 
affected by transparency and independence, though isolating the two effects is difficult.  
Geraats (2002) reviews developments in central bank transparency and major 
contributions to the research area. The author also illustrates five main ways to evaluate 
transparency in detail: political; economic; procedural, policy, operational3. This paradigm for 
measuring central bank transparency is utilized by Eichengreen and Dincer (2007), (2009), and 
(2013). Geraats points out that transparency is a necessary complement to central bank 
independence. The openness allows accountability of central banks, which enables the 
independence of central banks. Geraats points out that there is a strong and positive relationship 
                                                 
3 I will expand on the paradigm in the Data Selection section. 
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between independence and transparency across countries; however, there is no cross-country 
relationship between central bank independence and accountability. The author also provides us 
with a clear definition of what she perceives central bank transparency to be. Central bank 
transparency is, according to Geraats, the absence of asymmetric information between monetary 
policy makers and other economic agents. It reduces uncertainty about how the policy makers 
perceive the economy and what, if any, policy changes are forthcoming. Transparency, however, 
is not the same as perfect information. As long as the public and the central bank have the same 
information, then we will have a transparent situation. However, this is not the same as perfect 
information because both parties may face uncertainty about the economy’s structure. Moreover, 
it might be imprudent to apply a blanket statement that transparency is always beneficial. 
Transparency will remove information asymmetries; however, lack of transparency is probably 
not the only source of market failure. Therefore, Geraats also argues that the theory of second 
best implies that greater transparency might not increase welfare. Though one might expect a 
decline in uncertainty due to increased transparency to be welfare enhancing because it reduces 
forecast errors and expected variability, this might not always be the case. One exception to this 
rule would be that if the release of information by a central bank was vague or unreliable then it 
could be welfare reducing. Geraats argues that political transparency, via formal objectives, 
quantitative targets and clarity about institutional structure, is the most vital of the five 
transparency aspects. This is because political transparency provides a means and benchmark for 
judgment and evaluation. Finally, the author finds that transparency would be undesirable if the 
central banker is conservative and subject to political pressures. 
Geraats (2001a) evaluates the effects of transparency on strong and weak central banks. 
The author describes a strong central bank as a bank with a lower, unpublished, inflation target 
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compared to weaker banks. The study finds that if transparency is imposed by the public, a 
weaker central bank will favor confidentiality because it is easier for the bank to conduct 
stabilization policies without their preferences for a higher inflation being revealed. However if 
transparency is self-imposed by a central bank, weak banks will still choose more transparency. 
This is due to the fact that a central bank that portrays any secrecy in itself will be seen by the 
public as a sign of weakness. Therefore even weak central banks will opt instead for 
transparency. Similarly, Geraats (2001b) highlights that benefits of economic transparency 
depend on institutional framework. There are negative uncertainty effects when a conservative 
central bank is subject to political interference. On the other hand, positive incentive effects exist 
when monetary policy is conducted by an independent central bank. 
Mishkin (2004) provides a convincing argument claiming that central bank transparency 
does have an optimal level, which can be damaging if passed. He reviews examples of positive 
and undermining transparency. To answer his question, ‘Can transparency go too far?’ Mishkin 
considers whether or not further increased transparency will help a central bank to operate, 
enabling it to conduct optimal monetary policy while being able to focus on long-run objectives. 
To do this, the author considers a simple new Keynesian framework and asks three questions: 
should central banks publish forecasts including further path of policy rates projections; should 
central banks announce objective functions; and how should central banks talk about output 
fluctuations? One of the benefits of increased transparency, according to the author, is that output 
volatility has fallen. Mishkin believes that transparency is beneficial up to the point that it 
simplifies communication with the public and generates support for the central banks to conduct 
policy optimally while being able to focus on long-run objectives. However, he argues that the 
communication process could be complicated to the point of detriment if transparency is 
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increased too much. For example, Mishkin considers a central bank announcing its objective 
function or projection of the path of the policy interest rate as too open. Showing disagreement 
and dissent amongst policy members would only heighten uncertainty. In addition, announcing a 
projection of the policy rate path to the public would prove problematic because the public 
would not be able to understand that this path is subject to changes in the state in the economy. 
Recent confusion in the US and the UK over ‘forward guidance’ could be evidence of this. 
Intermediate policy instruments are conditional on the future state of the economy and are 
subject to changes or deviations from forecast and realized rates. The public might not see these 
changes as course corrections, and instead they might view them as the central bank not fulfilling 
its commitments or, even worse, not being able to anticipate future policy accurately. Mishkin 
draws the analogy of political elections; if a candidate changes his views, even on something he 
did 10 years ago, voters feel this reflects on his judgment and leadership qualities. The same 
negative effects could be said for central bankers, which could result in a reversal of bank 
independence. One area where Mishkin believes transparency should be improved is central 
banks’ unwillingness to discuss that they wish to reduce output variability.  
Goodhart (2001) also queries whether the public would be confused about the proficiency 
of central bank members if, after providing information about intermediate targets, these 
intermediate targets are missed. Here the author inquires whether it is beneficial to provide 
information about forecasts for the future path of monetary policy in addition to inflation targets. 
It would be extremely difficult for the entire board to agree on a trajectory ahead of time and any 
dissention may be seen as undermining. 
Gersbach and Hahn (2001a) examine voting records and find that voting record 
transparency could be harmful. They look at a two-period monetary policy game where the 
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government elects central bankers for one period, after which they need to be reappointed.  
When first elected the central banker’s ability is private information. If voting records are not 
released to the public sector then the central banker’s capabilities will still be hidden and the 
same uncertainty will prevail during the second period. However, if there is increased 
transparency and voting records are made public initially, the authors find that central bankers 
will refuse to abstain from voting as to not appear incompetent. Instead, central bankers will cast 
random votes in order to maximize their chances of re-election. In this paper, the authors find 
that the random voting effect dominates and determine that the publication of individual voting 
records does more harm than good. On the other hand, Gersbach and Hahn (2001b) find that 
voting transparency is advantageous. Here the authors adjust their assumptions from their 
previous article. They assume that there exists unobservable heterogeneity in central bankers’ 
preferences. In addition, private benefits from re-election are sufficiently small. The authors find 
that there is a positive uncertainty effect in disclosing voting records because it allows 
governments to witness central bankers’ preferences, enabling only those central bankers with 
socially desirable preferences to be re-elected. Finally, Gersbach and Hahn caution that 
publishing voting records or minutes may subject central bankers to political pressures.  
Dotsey (1987), Rudin (1988b), and Tabellini (1987) are all similar studies with different 
conclusions, further example of how the existing literature is indecisive about the effects of 
central bank transparency. Dotsey (1987) finds central bank policy opacity to be desirable. The 
author assumes the central bank has a stochastic short term money target and that the average 
target would be known to the public. Nevertheless, there would still be asymmetric information 
about the white noise target disturbance. This would give rise to an uncertainty effect, increasing 
the variance of private sector forecast errors of the interbank rate. However, the central bank 
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secrecy reduces the variance of the interbank rate because it responds less to the unobserved 
money target disturbance. 
Rudin (1988b) extends Dotsey’s model and shows that an increase in transparency may 
have an increase in volatility when there are central bank watchers. Rudin finds that less secrecy 
about the non-borrowed reserves target could reduce the accuracy of interbank rate forecasts. 
Though this might seem contradictory, the reason for this reduced accuracy is that the reduction 
in secrecy makes central bank information easier to interpret. If it is less costly to monitor central 
banks, logically this would increase the amount of central bank watchers. This increase in the 
amount of watchers will result in a stronger response whenever there is a market disturbance, 
which will increase the interbank rate volatility. The ultimate consequence of the increase in 
transparency would be that it is harder to forecast. 
Tabellini (1987) also expands Dotsey’s research and comes to a different conclusion 
about transparency. Here the author assumes central banks have a constant non-borrowed 
reserves target. Financial markets are unable to observe the policy target and use the interbank 
rate instead. In this study, Tabellini finds that central bank policy secrecy increases the interbank 
rate variance. 
Cosimano and Van Huyck (1993) also find a circumstance when central bank policy 
secrecy is preferred. The authors review asymmetric information about central bank policy for 
reserve targets when the bank’s policy is to meet the reserve target while keeping the interbank 
rate low. They argue that the central bank’s trading desk has an incentive to manipulate current 
reserves because commercial banks use the interbank and deposit rates to infer the reserve target. 
By manipulating the current reserves, the central bank maintains a more favorable trade-off 
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between obtaining the reserve target and keeping the federal funds rate low. In this case, limiting 
public information is beneficial.  
Cukierman and Meltzer (1986) contribute towards the foundations of operational 
transparency. They say that transparency is connected to how easily the public can deduce 
central bank goals and intentions from observables. The authors use an infinite horizon version 
of a monetary policy game to show that there is asymmetric information about a central bank’s 
preference parameter for output stimulation, which is stochastic and has positive autocorrelation. 
The policy maker does not reveal the planned policy instrument and has imperfect control over 
inflation. Using observed past inflation outcomes, the private sector predicts what the policy 
maker’s future preference parameter for output stimulation will be. With greater precision, the 
private sector hones its inflation predictions and reduces the inflation bias. However, looser 
monetary control creates an uncertainty effect, which can be advantageous. Inflation uncertainty 
allows the policy maker to create surprise inflation when it is desirable. The authors find that the 
uncertainty effect could potentially outweigh incentive effect, which means that looser monetary 
control may be optimal.  
Eijffinger and Hoeberichts (2002) investigate the effects of accountability on 
macroeconomic outcomes. The authors focus on two types of accountability: accountability 
through final responsibility and accountability through transparency. The theoretical model 
utilized builds upon Lohmann (1992), Schaling and Nolan (1998) and Eijffinger et al. (2000). 
The conservative central banker has quasi-control (the government can override the central 
bank’s decision at a cost) over monetary policy and preferences for inflation stabilization relative 
to output stabilization are uncertain. Depending on whether the cost of overriding is prohibitive 
or negligible, final responsibility will rest either with the central bank or the government. The 
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authors review these two types of accountability and their effects on macroeconomic outcomes. 
Using a simplified Lucas supply function, a loss-function for the central bank and a loss-function 
for the government, their research shows that although transparency makes the region of 
independence smaller, effective central bank independence increases with transparency. Even 
though the region of independence turns out to be smaller, as transparency is increased 
macroeconomic outcomes move in the direction that the central bank prefers. Accountability via 
transparency leads to lower expected inflation and less stabilization of supply shocks. The 
authors also discuss the contentious topic of revealing voting records. They assert that making 
voting records public has limited benefits and furthermore, releasing the records could 
undermine the decision made by the majority.  
Faust and Svensson (2001) explore credibility, transparency, and reputation of central 
banks when their preferences are not conveyed publicly. The private sector infers central bank 
characteristics from policy outcomes. Three transparency regimes are considered: unobservable 
goal and intension; observable intention; observable goal and intention. The authors find that 
banks with more transparency fall under more public scrutiny over their actions than banks with 
less transparency, which makes banks more temperate and more likely to follow a policy similar 
to the socially optimal one. Faust and Svennsson find that while full transparency is socially 
beneficial, this scenario is generally worse for central banks. Moreover, central banks often want 
minimal transparency. The authors utilize a variation of the Cukierman and Meltzer (1986) 
model in the context of a stationary, low-inflation equilibrium, which they say has received less 
attention than moderate and high inflation equilibriums.  
Faust and Svensson (2002) investigate a central bank’s choice of degree of control and 
transparency under discretion and commitment. The authors also investigate the optimal degree 
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of control, which they define as the degree of equivalence between the intended and actual 
outcome of policy actions by the central bank. They define transparency as the degree to which 
central bank intentions can be inferred by the public. The authors use a backwards-looking new 
Keynesian approach with a quadratic loss function. They conclude that discretion is the most 
realistic assumption for control and commitment is the most realistic choice for transparency. 
Under commitment, the optimal choice of transparency for a central bank with a low average 
inflation bias will be minimal. However, under discretion both minimum and maximum 
transparency could be optimal. Faust and Svensson find that, if they have a low enough inflation 
bias, sufficiently patient central banks will always choose to have the least amount of 
transparency possible. 
Cukierman (2002) investigates models used in making policy decisions and the 
operational objectives of the central bank. The author has two main purposes: to evaluate the 
degree of transparency about the recent economic models used by central banks and their 
objective functions. Using both sticky-price and flexible-price transmission mechanisms, he 
finds that there is vagueness about the economic models used by central banks in forecasting as 
well as for their objective function. While there is relatively prevalent information about inflation 
targets, central banks are substantially less informative about output targets. Finally, Cukierman 
raises the question of full transparency, its feasibility, and if it is always beneficial. He 
summarizes by calling for further understanding of the costs and benefits of transparency.  
Walsh (2003) focuses on the role that the target inflation rate and the weight on the target 
objective have in affecting the incentives of a discretionary central bank. The paper’s 
contribution is to provide a framework for deriving an optimal weight to place on achieving the 
inflation target, which can be related to optimal performance measures as well as issues of 
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accountability and transparency. The author uses a new Keynesian model that analyzes monetary 
policy in models based on optimizing private sector behavior and nominal rigidities, which is 
similar to Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1999). Walsh finds that the trade-off between accountability 
and stabilization depends on the degree of transparency.  
Van der Cruijsen, Eijffinger, and Hoogduin (2010) uses the index from Eichengreen and 
Dincer (2007) and examine whether or not central banks should increase their degree of 
transparency any further. They find that there is an optimal intermediate degree of central bank 
transparency. If central banks are not operating at this point, it would improve private sector 
inflation forecasts if they moved towards this desirable transparency level. Above this optimal 
point of transparency, the authors find that one of two things might happen: the public might 
start to attach too much weight to the conditionality of their forecasts; and/or the public might get 
confused by the large amount of information received. Both of these potential consequences 
would decrease the quality of private sector inflation forecasts, causing inflation to be set in a 
more backward looking manner and resulting in higher inflation persistence. At the optimal 
intermediate degree of transparency inflation persistence is minimized. The authors find that 
some central banks could increase transparency while others have already reached their optimal 
level.  
Van der Cruijsen, Eijffinger, and Hoogduin (2010) argues that there is the potential for 
public obfuscation if large amounts of information from a very transparent central bank are 
released. Moreover, not every board member will view the economy in the same light and there 
may be contentious discussions about policy. The authors caution that an extreme level of 
transparency may cause the public to think that the central bank is uncertain about economic 
conditions, which would exacerbate volatility. Similarly, Clare and Courtenay (2001) find that if 
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minutes are released that describe debatable discussion among bank board members that this 
could increase asset price volatility, again implying that profuse amounts of information will 
only confuse investors.  
Swanson (2006), using a simple theoretical framework, determines that since the late 
1980s United States financial markets have been: better able to forecast the federal funds rate 
several months out; less surprised by policy announcements; more certain of their interest rate 
forecasts; and less diverse in the cross sectional variety of their interest rate forecasts. The author 
attributes these improvements to increases in the transparency of the Federal Reserve. He argues 
that while there appears to be a consensus that increased transparency is beneficial, there are few 
studies proving these benefits. Swanson defines transparency as the amount of information 
released to the public about the goals and conduct of monetary policy. Pointing out that there has 
been a dramatic deterioration in financial market forecast accuracy since 2001, the author 
attempts to shed light on two important questions: what are the reasons for the forecast 
deterioration; and is the forecast improvement prior to 2001 robust or does it disappear once 
controlling for factors that explain the deterioration since 2001? Swanson argues that if we blame 
the recent losses in accuracy on increased volatility in the federal funds rate then we might also 
have to attribute earlier gains to accuracy to reductions in federal funds rate volatility rather than 
increases to central bank transparency. He considers variables such as implied volatility from 
interest rate options and panel data from private sector forecasts of output, inflation, and interest 
rates, to investigate these two questions. The author concludes that January 2001 corresponds to 
a period of significant uncertainty about the future United States output and employment and 
therefore the deterioration in private sector forecasts of interest rates in 2001-2002 might reflect 
a general deterioration in the private sectors ability to forecast the economy. Despite this increase 
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in private sector forecast errors and uncertainty since 2001, improvement in interest rate 
forecasts appears to be a robust feature of the data, even after controlling for uncertainty about 
the state of the economy and changing in the federal funds rate momentum. Swanson finds 
strong evidence that the increase in Federal Reserve transparency has improved forecasting 
performance. Firstly, market forecast errors and cross sectional forecast dispersion of interest 
rates have fallen substantially while forecast errors of GDP and inflation have not. Secondly, 
market uncertainty about the future course of interest rates generally falls after explicit policy 
announcements. However, there is no significant response to implicit or unexplained policy 
announcements that were made by the Federal Reserve prior to February 1994.  
Bordo et al. (2007) takes a novel approach in investigating three great disinflations: the 
post-Civil War deflation, the post-WWI deflation, and the Volker disinflation. Many previous 
studies have focused on these periods, but here the authors analyze the role transparency and 
credibility during these three eras of deliberate monetary contraction.  
Freedman (2002) examines why central banks have become more transparent and 
discusses if there are limits to what information should be released to the public. Freedman 
contends that the reasons for an increase in transparency are twofold: transparency allows 
monetary policy to be more effective; and because of the link between transparency and 
accountability. Increased transparency benefits the view of the central bank and monetary policy 
in the eyes of the public, via increased understanding of policy and decision, and in the eyes of 
financial market participants, via increased understanding and anticipations of central bank 
actions. Freedman argues that if expectations are concurrent with policy decisions, this should 
lead to less volatility in financial markets and smoother absorption of policy actions. However, 
the author also warns that too much transparency could be counterproductive and reviews an 
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example of televising policy making meetings. Freedman says that if deliberations were televised 
that a few issues could arise: members would be reserved and less likely to argue both sides of an 
issue; members would find it more difficult to change their minds after initially declaring a 
stance out of fear of being indecisive; and that these informal discussions could replace formal 
information releases that come at later dates. 
Poole, Rasche, and Thornton (2002) examine how much market participants anticipate 
policy actions. They argue that the reason behind the move towards greater transparency is 
twofold: monetary policy is a main driving force behind inflation; and market expectations and 
bank credibility are vital to monetary policy success. The authors conclude that increased 
transparency has assisted market participants in predicting rate changes in addition to allowing 
the participants to forecast changes further in advance than prior to 1994. They note that this is 
especially important since it is the changes in longer-term interest rates that generate significant 
changes in economic variables. Finally the authors draw the conclusion that since 1994 there has 
been exceptional economic stability and that this has occurred at the same time as the move to 
greater transparency; Poole, Rasche, and Thornton attribute this stability in part to the increase in 
transparency. However, one wonders what their thoughts on greater transparency would be in the 
current economic climate. 
Lapp, Pearce, and Laksanasut (2003) investigate whether or not the public can predict 
Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) policy changes. They review all possible policy 
decisions (tightening, easing, or left unchanged) and estimate probabilities of each choice using a 
probit model. They find a relationship between policy decisions and economic activity, but also 
find that the relationship does not predict the decisions themselves. The authors argue that short-
term interest rate changes can help anticipate policy decisions. However, on the whole they find 
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that FOMC decisions are not reliably predictable given the data available at the time. In addition 
they find that models which included money supply growth, trade deficits, exchange rate 
changes, and stock price movements did not accurately predict FOMC changes. Finally, based on 
these results the authors deduce that FOMC decisions are not transparent enough for accurate 
public predictions of policy changes. 
Finel and Lord (1999) looks at transparency and its effects in the realm of politics. They 
argue that transparency informs the public of levels of risk and is related to legal, political, and 
institutional structures. The authors consider two extremes of transparency, first where 
transparency defuses international crises and second where transparency exacerbates 
international crises. They also suggest, but do not test, that there could be nonlinear effects of 
transparency. They develop a qualitative index based on three different aspects of transparency: 
debate, control, and disclosure. Debate considers the degree to which there is debate over ideas; 
control refers to how the government releases information to the public; and disclosure refers to 
how often the government releases the same information. The authors conclude that often 
transparency can exacerbate crises, particularly because media will often pay more attention to 
sensational stories rather than calming statements. Additionally they contest that transparency 
may derail negotiations. 
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ii. Transparency as it relates to Output 
The effect of transparency on output volatility is an area not often explored in the 
literature. Most of the research surrounding transparency effects focuses on inflation variability 
and persistence. The studies that do attempt to explain output volatility use limited central bank 
transparency data sets. It is puzzling why output volatility is not investigated more as output 
stabilization is a key component of economic stability. Utilizing the most comprehensive indices 
available, my research investigates the relationship between transparency and output volatility in 
the hope of clarifying the connection between the two variables.  
Two studies that offer significant contributions towards measuring output volatility are 
Chortareas, Stasavage and Sterne (2002) and Corbo et al. (2001). Chortareas, Stasavage and 
Sterne (2002) measure output volatility based on the standard deviation of GDP growth using 
quarterly GDP data where available or annual data. Corbo et al. (2001) find that inflation 
targeting reduces inflation forecast errors, inflation persistence and the volatility of output while 
it increases output persistence.  It is important to remember that there is a well-founded tradeoff 
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between inflation and output. If we mitigate output volatility there may be repercussions on 
inflation.  
In addition to a thorough review of their index and determinants of central bank 
transparency, Dincer and Eichengreen (2007) also examine the relationship between output 
variation and the level of transparency. The authors consider the impact on output variability, 
inflation variability, and inflation persistence. Past inflation is found to be positively related to 
inflation variability and financial depth is negatively related to inflation variability. Additionally, 
Dincer and Eichengreen find that transparency tends to reduce inflation persistence. For output 
variability the authors use the standard deviation of the growth rate over the most recent three-
year period; my analysis includes this measure of output volatility and contributes an additional 
measure by using the standard deviation of the growth rate over the most recent five-year period 
to incorporate the typical business cycle length. The authors’ results show an increase in 
transparency reduces output volatility. Their examination reflects favorable, but relatively weak 
impacts on inflation and output volatility. My research takes the groundbreaking work of Dincer 
and Eichengreen (2007), extends it by utilizing the additional years of data provided by Dincer 
and Eichengreen (2013), and goes beyond pooled regressions to include fixed effects, random 
effects, and GMM in two different models of central bank transparency’s effect on output 
volatility. 
 Jensen (2001) finds that increases in transparency can be potentially welfare reducing. 
Using a framework similar to Faust and Svensson (2001), the author looks at a simple, two-
period, forward-looking model where the central bank has imperfect control over the output gap 
through an unobservable policy instrument. The model features the trade-off between output gap 
volatility and inflation. Here not every firm is able to change its prices at the beginning of every 
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period, meaning that there are implications for output in the current period. Under these 
circumstances the private sector uses the output gap to predict the next period’s inflation. The 
author finds that increased operational transparency allows the private sector to be more precise 
in their estimates, reducing the inflation bias. The study also shows that operational transparency 
may be detrimental for central banks. This form of transparency can reduce central bank 
flexibility via an adverse uncertainty effect; openness regarding control errors can exacerbate the 
inflation-output trade-off as central banks may have to pay more attention to inflation rather than 
output gap stabilization. Jensen finds that there will exist an optimal degree of transparency. 
Faust and Svensson (2001) have a very different result. They find that high levels of 
transparency are beneficial. The reason for this distinction is the assumptions in the model 
framework. Faust and Svensson utilize a Lucas-style supply function and inflation expectations 
are formed at the beginning of the period. 
Faust and Svensson (2001) extend Cukierman and Meltzer (1986). The former alter the 
central bank’s objective function so that inflation responds to private sector inflation 
expectations. Here the central bank cares about output stabilization. The output target is not 
released to the public, so the public attempts to infer the policy maker’s optimal target from 
inflation. The authors define operational transparency as the extent to which the monetary 
control errors are disclosed to the private sector. Their research finds that greater operational 
transparency will usually improve social welfare, but is probably not preferred by central banks. 
Greater operational transparency makes the public more responsive to inflation via their inflation 
expectations. This offers a reason to reduce the inflation bias. There would be less room for 
surprise inflation, which is socially beneficial since it reduces the variance of output.  
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Cecchetti and Krause (2002) look at the variability of inflation and output and analyze the 
effects of central bank independence, accountability, and transparency using the Fry et al. (2000) 
indices. The Fry et al. indices create a measure of transparency by looking at the responses to the 
extent and frequency at which central banks provide reports. The index is a simple average of 
three reporting criteria: policy decisions, assessments about the state of the economy, and public 
explanations of forecasts. Cecchetti and Krause argue that more information is always better than 
less. With full information, people should make the most efficient decisions possible. Along 
these lines, the authors state that good and transparent policy should allow markets and the 
economy to respond to the data released only and not to the policymakers themselves. Cecchetti 
and Krause recognize that there are economists who argue that there are forms of central bank 
secrecy that can be efficient, citing that policy surprises can be effective and that released 
information can be misinterpreted. However the authors feel that these arguments have not been 
persuasive and full transparency is best. The level of transparency continues to be a contentious 
issue. Ceccheeti and Krause study a cross section of countries and measure performance as a 
weighted average of output and inflation variability. The authors derive measures of 
macroeconomic performance and policy efficiency using the inflation-output variability trade-off 
or efficiency frontier. Their measure of policy efficiency is related to the distance of the 
economy’s performance point to the inflation-output variability frontier. Their results suggest 
that credibility and transparency, albeit to a lesser extent than credibility, improve 
macroeconomic performance. 
Chortareas, Stasavage, and Sterne (2002) consider questions regarding the institutional 
characteristics of central banks and their effect on economic performance. Particularly they 
review recent analyses that have attempted to identify optimal degrees of independence, 
27 
accountability, and transparency in monetary policy. They point out that there is a plethora of 
research regarding the importance of central bank independence; however, there is limited 
literature regarding the issues of transparency and accountability in monetary policy. In their 
article, they focus on how published economic forecasts are associated with inflation and output 
in a cross section of 87 countries, utilizing the data set based on the survey conducted by Fry et 
al. (2000). Their results show that a higher degree of transparency in monetary policy is 
associated with lower inflation. Furthermore, they do not find any evidence to support the idea 
that increased transparency is associated with increased output volatility. Chortareas, Stasavage, 
and Sterne note that increased transparency may reduce uncertainty in financial markets, though 
the authors mention that a high degree of transparency is not always desirable. The authors find 
that there is a statistically significant negative correlation between transparency and inflation; 
however, there is no evidence of a cost of transparency in terms of increased output volatility. 
Instead of taking the average of different transparency measures, they measure transparency 
using a Guttman scale. A Guttman scale is created by arranging binary variables in a sequence 
such that a positive value for one indicator implies a positive value for all previous variables in 
the sequence. The main advantage for using a Guttman scale is that the scale is constructed from 
several indicators and no information is lost by aggregation. The authors measure output 
volatility based on the standard deviation of GDP growth using quarterly GDP data where 
available or annual data. Generally, they find that correlation between transparency and output 
volatility is negative. Their article is one of the first to provide cross-country empirical evidence 
using macroeconomic data. They conclude that in order to be sure that their tests using cross 
section data eliminate all possible biases that they will need more data. They argue that existing 
literature is almost entirely unanimous that increased transparency in monetary policy leads to 
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lower inflation. The authors do not find that increased transparency is associated with an increase 
in output volatility.  
Fatas, Mihov, and Rose (2007) help to bridge the gap between theoretical support and 
empirical support of increased transparency. They use annual data from 1960 to 2000 for over 40 
countries and look at three types of quantitative monetary targets: exchange rates, money growth 
rates, and inflation targets. The authors investigate not only the effects of having transparent 
monetary policies in place, but also the effects of these successful transparency policies. 
Utilizing ordinary least squares, the authors find that countries with clear targets for monetary 
policy will have lower inflation and that countries that reach their policy targets will lower 
inflation even further. The authors also look into how different regimes affect output volatility 
and growth. They conclude that having a monetary target, which is achieved, will reduce output 
volatility and increase growth. 
 
 
iii. Transparency as it relates to Financial Markets 
One of the main objectives of central banks is to conduct effective monetary policy, 
focusing on macroeconomic variables such as inflation and often output and employment. 
However the tools they use to influence the economy are indirectly linked to these variables, and 
usually manipulated via a myriad of different financial assets. Ceteris paribus, stock and bond 
markets are an indication of financial strength and by extension the health and wealth of a nation. 
The ability to isolate the effect of the level of central bank transparency on financial markets 
characteristics is vitally important as these immediate targets and indicators bridge the gap 
between monetary policy and its objectives.  
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The effect of transparency on financial market volatility is a point of contention in the 
literature. Authors do not universally agree if transparency is beneficial or detrimental. Geraats 
(2002) notes that an unsolved empirical issue is whether or not central bank transparency 
increases volatility in financial markets. Blinder (1998) is seminal research which argues for 
further transparency. The author finds that greater openness is fundamental to any democracy. 
Blinder (1998) and Blinder et. al. (2001) find that public disclosure of policies may improve the 
efficiency of financial markets by curtailing excessive speculation, thereby reducing the 
volatility of markets, which is in contrast to what Dotsey (1987) and Rudin (1988) conclude. 
Tabellini (1987) concludes that increased levels of transparency reduce a source of market 
uncertainty. Thornton (1996) finds that the Fed’s policy shift towards immediate disclosure 
results in a lower forecast error in all interest rates since 1994 as measured by mean squared 
error. However, more research needs to be done as the author finds that this may be the case 
because financial markets were relatively quiet during the time range studied and not due to the 
policy shift. Coppel and Connolly (2003) research how Australian financial markets anticipate 
monetary policy changes of the central bank. The author’s conclusions maintain Tabellini’s 
findings that increased transparency should lower unconditional volatility and improve 
anticipation of changes in policy. Policy moves seem to be more integrated over a two-week 
period prior to the policy change, decreasing immediate effects to financial markets on the day of 
the announcement, which could prove to also be a negative effect as it removes central banks’ 
ability to make surprise, unanticipated policy decisions. Muller and Zelmer (1999) find that the 
greater transparency the better the predictions by markets. Anticipation and reaction speed 
improve with increased transparency. My research explores the relationship between 
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transparency and financial market volatility in hopes of clarifying the connection between the 
two variables.  
Murdzhev and Tomljanovich (2006) describe how central banks around the world have 
transformed over the past 15 years and have become more transparent. Central banks used to 
operate under a veil of secrecy. Murdzhev and Tomljanovich state that until recently central 
bankers believed that monetary policy was most effective when market participants were unable 
to accurately forecast the timing, direction and magnitude of future policy moves. Starting in 
1989 with the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, the authors found that central banks began to 
disclose greater information to the public consisting of public statements immediately after 
policy meetings, voting records, minutes and transcripts of policy meetings, and inflation 
forecasts. Their paper identifies the extent that monetary policy meetings and announcements 
have influenced the corresponding financial markets after transparency shifts of the central banks 
of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States using 
daily data from January 1, 1990 to December 31, 2003. They study their selected six central 
banks as they become more open during the 1990s to determine whether more open disclosure 
improved or worsened financial markets predictability. The authors used both ordinary least 
squares (OLS) and exponential generalized auto-regressive conditional heteroskedasticity 
(EGARCH) frameworks and find that all countries’ bond markets were better able to anticipate 
official rate changes. There is a reduction in the policy lag as interest rates begin to move before 
the policy shift occurs. The authors also use OLS and EGARCH to study the effects on the stock 
market. They find that traders move from reacting to policy changes to incorporating predictions 
into stock market prices so any policy changes do not affect the stock indices at the time of 
announcement, making the announcement itself a non-event. One might induce that this makes 
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stock market indices less volatile, which is one question that I aim to expand on later. The 
authors find that increased openness removes a source of uncertainty and helps smooth the 
functioning of financial markets. Murdzhev and Tomljanovich also identify if the increase in 
transparency has a marginal effect on bond markets once other macroeconomic factors are 
controlled for. Depending on the country, they examine weekly unemployment claims, 
unemployment rates, inflation rates, and real GDP. The authors find that their results are 
unchanged and markets use information given by the central bank, in addition to other key 
macroeconomic variables, to determine future policy rate decisions.  
Tomljanovich (2007) examines the degree of information that central banks release to the 
public to see if there is any effect on financial markets. The study analyzes the move towards 
greater transparency and how this has influenced financial markets, rather than macroeconomic 
factors on which most articles focus. The author suggests that it is possible that central banks 
have become too candid in their discussions with the public. The research considers seven 
industrialized countries to see whether the selected central banks’ movement toward more candid 
disclosure in the 1990s enhanced or deteriorated the predictability of each country’s financial 
markets. Using autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (ARCH) and vector autoregressions 
(VARs), the author finds that, with the exception of Germany, all countries’ forecasting error on 
interest rates for government bonds decreased for most maturity lengths. The author’s results are 
consistent with Tabellini (1987), which argues that increased central bank openness removes 
uncertainty and smoothes the functioning of financial markets. Tomljanovich also finds that the 
effect is stronger for central banks that have moved towards greater disclosure.  
Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2007) explore the move by central banks towards 
independence, accountability, and transparency. Numerous people within central banks are 
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responsible for monetary policy decisions, but only one policy direction is announced. However, 
given the new age of transparency, central banks have to decide how individual committee 
members should communicate their views with the public, if at all. The authors seek to define an 
optimal communication strategy and review the strategies of the Federal Reserve, the European 
Central Bank, and the Bank of England and their efficacy. They point out that it largely depends 
on the decision-making process of the committee. Often decisions are made after considering 
every individual’s opinion within the group; on the other hand decisions can be made in more of 
an individual manner. The authors consider two questions: do communication strategies in the 
three aforementioned central banks differ and how; secondly, they assess the effectiveness of 
communication by considering whether it allows financial markets to better anticipate monetary 
policy decisions. Communication may have a dual effect on the level of asset prices as well as 
the degree of uncertainty and volatility. To test for both, they model the effect of communication 
on asset price returns and on asset price volatility in a standard EGARCH framework. The 
authors find that central bank communication is both statistically and economically important 
when considering the effect on financial markets. They show that the Federal Reserve pursues a 
highly individualistic communication strategy and a collegial decision making approach, the 
European Central Bank has both a collegial approach to its communication and its decision 
making strategies, and the Bank of England uses a collegial communication strategy but an 
individualistic decision making approach. Considering the three strategies, the authors find that 
the predictability of policy decisions and the responsiveness of financial markets to central bank 
communication are equally good for the European Central Bank and the Federal Reserve, 
suggesting that there might not be one best approach to communication strategy.  
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Born, Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2010) builds upon Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2007) and 
looks at central bank communication as a policy tool. The authors examine how communication 
affects financial markets by building a data set that encompasses an empirical assessment of 
financial market reactions to more than 1,000 releases of Financial Stability Reports (FSR) and 
speeches in 36 countries over a 14-year period. They find that these reports have a significant 
and long-lasting effect on stock market returns and tend to reduce market volatility, whereas 
speeches and interviews have little effect on market returns and tend to increase volatility. Their 
results show that not only is increased communication from central banks important, but the 
method of communication is potentially even more important. Born, Ehrmann and Fratzscher 
(2013) expands on their previous research, extends the panel to 37 central banks and includes 
data for the 2007-2010 global crisis. The authors’ research suggests that optimistic FSRs result in 
significant positive abnormal stock market returns and find no effect with pessimistic FSRs. 
Interestingly, their findings suggest that speeches and interviews have smaller effects on 
financial market returns during calm periods compared to the more influential effect they had 
during the recent financial crisis. Born, Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2012) finds similar results but 
for emerging market countries.  
Bekaert, Hoerova, and Lo Duca (2010) prove a strong co-movement between the VIX 
and monetary policy. Their research is the first to provide an empirical link between monetary 
policy and risk aversion in asset markets. The authors enhance their argument to understand the 
link between monetary policy and the VIX by reviewing Bloom (2009) and Bloom, Floetotto and 
Jaimovich (2009), which show that heightened economic uncertainty decreases employment and 
output. Moreover, Thorbecke (1997), Rigobon and Sack (2004), and Bernanke and Kuttner 
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(2005) all find that expansionary monetary policy affects the stock market positively while 
contractionary monetary policy affects the stock market negatively.  
Bernanke and Gertler (2001) ask whether central banks should react to asset price 
volatility. The authors believe that this is an important question because asset booms and busts 
have often been responsible for macroeconomic swings across the world in recent years. My 
research asks if central bank transparency affects stock market price volatility; therefore the 
question posed by Bernanke and Gertler (2001) is particularly important. The authors argue that 
any changes to prices should affect policy decisions only if these changes affect the inflation 
forecast. In the modern era of macroprudential supervision, it is necessary to identify if 
stabilization policy decisions made by central banks are in themselves destabilizing.  
Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) highlights the importance of understanding the connection 
between monetary policy and asset prices, particularly the market for equities. Distinguishing 
between expected and unexpected policy actions utilizing Federal funds futures, the authors try 
to quantify the average stock market reaction as well as try to explain the economic reasons for 
the reaction. They also use a VAR to calculate changes in expectations of future interest rates, 
dividends, and excess returns. Bernanke and Kuttner prove that equity markets react strongly to 
surprise rate changes. In fact, the authors show that the CRSP value-weighted index will reflect a 
1% gain in response to a surprise 25-basis-point easing. As expected, anticipated Federal funds 
rate changes elicit little or no market reactions. Interestingly, they conclude that surprise 
monetary policy actions have differing affects across industries; high-tech and 
telecommunication sectors have a more substantial response than broad market indices, while 
energy and utilities do not seem to be affected by monetary policy changes.  
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Thornton (1996) reviews how information announcements by the FOMC affect the 
market as well as if the policy of immediate disclosure has changed financial market uncertainty. 
Until February 1994, the FOMC announced their policy directive 45 days after their meeting. 
The FOMC claimed that immediate announcements of policy decisions would create an 
announcement effect, which could increase the volatility of financial markets. Looking at the 
federal funds rate from January 1988 through January 1996, the author finds that there was 
indeed an announcement effect. However, the effect appeared both before and after the FOMC 
adopted a policy of immediate disclosure and the magnitude of the effect was the same in both 
cases. He also found a delay in the market’s reaction when disclosure was not immediate but no 
such delay when it was immediate. Thornton then goes on to investigate whether or not 
immediate disclosure increases or decreases uncertainty using mean square error (MSE) and 
mean absolute forecast error (MAE). Both of these variables measure uncertainty or the error 
that individuals make in forecasting the future. If there is no uncertainty, then the individuals’ 
forecasts of the federal funds rate would fall within the range of random error. Using 
autoregressive (AR) models, Thornton shows that MSE and MAE decline after 1994, suggesting 
that a portion of the improvement in the futures market forecasts is due to a reduction in the 
volatility of the funds rate. The results suggest that the Fed’s policy of immediate disclosure may 
have reduced the market’s volatility and uncertainty, which is contrary to the Fed’s argument for 
privacy. There are noticeable improvements in forecasts by the federal funds rate futures market 
relative to statistical models since their disclosure policy has been implemented. Thornton finds 
that the Fed’s policy of immediate disclosure has been beneficial. 
Romer and Romer (2000) investigate the presence of asymmetric information between 
the Federal Reserve and the public. Confidential information is destined to lead to asymmetric 
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information. However, if the information withheld is relevant for effective monetary policy, this 
might still be a beneficial circumstance. The authors look at Federal Reserve and commercial 
inflation forecasts and find that the Federal Reserve has a considerable amount of private 
information to which the public is not privy. The Federal Reserve staff forecasts for inflation and 
output outperform commercial forecasts. The reason for this discrepancy and information 
asymmetry is due to the extensive resources devoted to forecasting at the Federal Reserve. 
Romer and Romer also find that commercial forecasters modify their forecasts in response to the 
central bank’s policy actions, which might explain why long-term interest rates often rise in 
response to shifts to tighter monetary policy. Peek, Rosengren, and Tootell (1999) comes to a 
similar conclusion. They find that forecasts in the United States could be improved with the use 
of confidential data on bank supervision. Romer and Romer conclude by suggesting that the 
Federal Reserve could reduce the asymmetric information advantage by releasing Green Book 
forecasts as soon as they are available. The immediate release would increase transparency by 
showing the motivation behind FOMC meetings, which could reduce financial market volatility.  
Artis, Mizen, and Kontolemis (1998) review the consequences of publicizing voting 
patterns of Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) members. The authors suggest that the results in 
the United Kingdom have cautioned the European Central Bank from following suit. Publishing 
minutes too soon forces the justification of monetary policy instruments before the outcome for 
inflation two years later. If there is a policy lag the results of instrument implementation will not 
be immediately evident, which may disturb or confuse markets.  
Zavodny and Ginther (2005) investigate whether or not the Beige Book affects stock 
prices and interest rates. They note that there have been many studies that indicate that 
macroeconomic data releases cause movement in financial markets and financial instruments; 
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however, little research has investigated whether financial markets respond to qualitative 
indicators. There are many reasons why the Beige Book would influence financial markets: it is a 
good indicator of economic activity; a significant predictor of both current and next-quarter 
GDP; it is a good summary of economic activity going into FOMC meetings; and it is a 
significant predictor of changes in the federal funds rate. Using varying maturities of treasury 
yields from 1983 through 2001, the authors employ a simple random walk model and OLS. The 
authors find that the Beige Book index is significantly associated with changes in the six-month 
and one-year rate at the 10% level and the two-year, five-year and 10-year rate at the 5% level as 
well as the 30-year rate, though not with the three-month t-bill rate or with changes in the 30-day 
federal funds futures rate. However, they do not find a significant relationship between stock 
returns and the Beige Book index. The authors also suggest that FOMC increased transparency 
may have reduced the validity of the Beige Book as an indicator of monetary policy. In sum, 
financial markets view the Beige Book as a summary indicator of economic growth, but not an 
indicator of monetary policy moves.    
Vishwanath and Kaufmann (2001) postulate that transparency is vital to the financial 
sector. The motivation behind their research is the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s. The 
authors claim not enough transparency is one of the factors that cause and contribute towards 
financial crises. The article contends that transparency is vital to the timeliness, relevance, and 
quality of the operation of the financial sector. The argument is that more relevant information 
will increase efficiency and resource allocation will improve. For financial markets, this would 
mean that with increased transparency capital should be directed towards its most productive 
uses. However, they caution that information imperfections could exist, which would introduce a 
new element of risk. Transparency may not be ideal when there are issues of confidentiality, 
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national security, and market instability. The authors review the wide range of meanings of 
transparency and argue that defining a good empirical measure of transparency is necessary in 
order to assess its true effects.  
Two studies that find that the implementation of increased information disclosure in 
monetary policy is associated with a decline in the response of market interest rates to changes in 
the official interest rate are Muller and Zelmer (1999) and Haldane and Read (2000). Muller and 
Zelmer (1999) find an exchange rate response to the release of Monetary Policy Reports in 
Canada. Haldane and Read (2000) look at the United Kingdom and the United States and 
decompose the effect of an official interest rate change on the yield curve into macroeconomic 
news and information about monetary policy preferences. The former would affect the short end 
and the latter would affect the long end. The authors conclude that there is a significant decrease 
in the effect of monetary policy actions on the short end of the yield curve, which suggests that 
transparency has decreased asymmetric information. 
Chadha and Nolan (2001) find that since the independence of the Bank of England, there 
has been an increase in the daily volatility of short term interest rates. Interestingly, though, they 
find that this does not seem to be due to monetary policy announcements. Clare and Courtenay 
(2001) look at United Kingdom financial markets on announcement versus non-announcements 
days and analyze the effect of monetary policy decisions and the release of macroeconomic data. 
Their results find that the independence of the Bank of England has had effects on exchange 
rates, equity and interest futures. Additionally, they find that there is a significantly smaller 
lasting effect of macroeconomic announcements on bond and equity futures.  
Rogoff (1999) reviews changes that developing countries should take in order to reduce 
the possibility of financial crises. The author recommends that the G22 increase central bank 
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transparency and improve regulations. Rogoff argues that increased transparency would aid in 
achieving more efficient global markets. However, he adds that as long as banks have currency 
mismatches then the financial system would still be vulnerable to bank runs regardless of how 
transparent the market is.  
Neuenkirch (2012) sampling nine major central banks from January 1999 through July 
2007, the author examines central bank transparency’s influence and central bank 
communication on money market expectations. The research finds that informal communications 
reduce the variation of expectations and therefore aid in managing financial market expectations. 
In addition, transparency reduces bias in money market expectations. A similar study is Siklos 
(2000), which examines survey data and finds that private sector inflation forecasts diminish 
months after inflation reports are published.  
 Boudoukh, Feldman, Kogan and Richardson (2012) seeks to disprove Roll (1988), which 
finds that there is little relation between stock prices and news. The authors argue that the issue 
with current finance literature is that it has done a poor job of identifying relevant news from 
noise. To pinpoint relevant news, the authors use textual analysis to convert qualitative 
information in both news stories and company announcements into a measurable quantity by 
analyzing the positive or negative tone of the information released. By analyzing the tone of 
releases rather than just a positive and negative word count comparison, they find considerable 
evidence of a relationship between stock price changes and information. Their results find that 
on identified news versus no news days that the variance ratios of returns are 120% higher versus 
only 20% for unidentified news versus no news. Moreover, on identified news days they find the 
volatility of stock prices is more than double that of other days, which supports my theory that 
the increase in information adds to volatility.  
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III. A Theoretical Framework 
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Whether or not increased central bank transparency has an effect on output and financial 
market volatility and whether it does or does not lead to optimal outcomes are all important 
questions for consideration. In this section I illustrate models and methodologies to investigate 
the effects of transparency on output and financial markets. The literature argues for various 
levels of transparency. Cukierman and Metzler (1986) find that ambiguity is preferred to 
transparency by a central authority with frequently changing political objectives and a relatively 
high rate of time preference. Opacity gives the central authority greater control over the timing of 
monetary shocks.  
The transmission mechanism between central bank transparency and output and financial 
market volatility may not be entirely clear. The clarity, detail and speed with which central banks 
convey information to the public should allow businesses and investors to make more informed 
decisions, both concerning the immediate economic climate and the future. Improved 
information concerning the current and future state of the economy, and therefore interest rates, 
should generally permit businesses and investors to make more knowledgeable decisions. More 
transparency surrounding monetary policy tools will convey more tangible information about the 
expense of doing business, the state of the economy, the future of asset prices, amongst many 
other factors. Therefore, the amount of central bank transparency should have a direct 
relationship on both output and financial market volatility. 
Hypothetically, not only could central bank transparency affect output and financial 
market volatility, but there should be an optimal level of transparency. Full transparency, 
revealing everything the central bank thinks about the state of the economy, surely cannot be the 
most advantageous scenario. At its worst, information can be confusing, inundating, incomplete, 
irrelevant or incomprehensible. Live video coverage of policy meetings that capture dissension 
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between central bankers would probably make the public very uncomfortable, especially if there 
is dissension. Revealing which banks receive aid through emergency short-term lending 
programs could lead to the demise of said banks either from runs or a new shortage funding from 
other sources. Full openness may also expose central banks to political pressures. If policy 
makers’ decisions, thoughts and discussions are available to the public it is inevitable that 
politicians will have more ammunition to criticize the central bankers. Clearly these would be 
instances when full transparency would not be desirable and may exacerbate volatility and 
uncertainty; a state of transparency between zero and full openness that is optimal must exist. I 
explore this possibility in my analysis with squared values of central bank transparency.  
It is important that research presented here does not explore normative economic 
arguments, nor judge whether a decline in financial market and output volatility is welfare 
enhancing or reducing. A decline in output volatility is likely welfare enhancing as this would 
mean that output growth is smoothed, more accurate to predict, and therefore the economic 
climate is easier for governments and businesses to forecast and make decisions. However, it is 
less clear whether financial market volatility is welfare enhancing as investors can profit from 
changing market conditions. Furthermore the central bank welfare function will differ from the 
public welfare function; do we assume we have a benevolent central banker? If a decline in 
volatility is beneficial for society, then one could assume both loss functions are equal for 
simplicity. These questions are worth pursuing; however, they are outside the scope of this 
research.  
 The theoretical framework I utilize most closely resembles the model presented in 
Arellano and Bond (1991). I include individual, country effects in the models using the Arellano 
and Bond method of using differencing rather than the Arellano and Bover (1995) approach of 
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using orthogonal deviations, which is more useful with small samples. My data is a panel that 
consists of a large number of observations (N) and a small time period (T). I expound linear 
functional relationships including dynamic variables, independent variables that are not strictly 
exogenous, and data that are likely to have both heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation present 
within countries but not across them.  
Dincer and Eichengreen (2007) assess the impact on output variability, inflation 
variability, and inflation persistence. The authors note that transparency could theoretically either 
exacerbate or thwart output variability. Some previous studies suggest that an increase in 
transparency is associated with more stability because the public is able to adjust more quickly to 
policy actions. However, there have been other studies that suggest that more transparency could 
increase output volatility because it prevents authorities from using policy as effectively to 
correct for output fluctuations or because coordination externalities will make individuals 
misread the public signals. They use the rule of law as an instrument for central bank 
transparency to overcome the issue of endogeneity of monetary policy transparency and find that 
their results are consistent with a negative impact of transparency on output volatility. Following 
Dincer and Eichengreen (2007), I use the rule of law as an instrument for transparency in order 
to address the problem of endogeneity.  
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i. Output Model 
 
 I consider two primary models to examine output volatility, both of which are similar to 
the model presented in Dincer and Eichengreen (2007). When they modeled output volatility, 
Dincer and Eichengreen (2007) solely used instrumental variable pooled regressions to examine 
the effects of transparency. They find evidence of a negative effect on output volatility; however 
their findings are limited to a pooled regression only. I compare additional models and 
methodologies in an attempt to find a better fit for the data.  
 The first model examines transparency’s relationship with output volatility; later this 
model will include lagged values of the endogenous variable, making it an Arellano-Bond 
dynamic panel. The second includes a squared transparency index variable in the equation to 
look for diminishing returns to transparency. Financial depth, measured as M2/GDP, and past 
inflation, measured as the previous period’s inflation, are included as control variables in both 
models. These control variables may or may not be statistically significant and will most likely 
not be economically significant. In microeconometrics it is often good practice to include such 
variables as controls if the economic theory supporting their inclusion is strong. Including 
control variables, even insignificant ones, reduces the possibility of inconsistent parameter 
estimates due to omitted variables; however, this may be accomplished at the expense of a 
decrease in precision in the model estimate.  
Transparency Model 
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝛽𝛽1𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 +  𝛽𝛽2𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 +  𝜐𝜐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  
Where, 
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = output volatility 
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𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 = transparency index 
𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 = financial depth 
𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3 = past inflation 
𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 = unobserved effect 
𝜐𝜐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = error term 
Though other models will be tested for comparison and validity, the model here is presented in 
fixed effects form as this should be the best fit for the data. I conjecture that all of the 
coefficients of the parameters on the regressors will be positive with the exception of 
transparency index, which I conjecture will be a negative relationship. 
Optimal Transparency Model 
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝛽𝛽1𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12 +  𝛽𝛽3𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 +  𝛽𝛽4𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3 +  𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 +  𝜐𝜐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
Where, 
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = output volatility 
𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 = transparency index 
𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 = financial depth 
𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3 = past inflation 
𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 = unobserved effect 
𝜐𝜐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = error term 
Again the model is presented in fixed effects form. I conjecture that all of the coefficients of the 
parameters on the regressors will be positive with the exception of transparency index, which I 
conjecture will be a negative relationship. The positive coefficient on the squared term should 
indicate the diminishing returns to transparency and therefore that there exists some optimal 
level of transparency.  
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ii. Financial Market Model  
 
 I present two primary models to examine financial market volatility. The first model 
examines transparency’s relationship with financial market volatility; later this model will 
include lagged values of the endogenous variable, making it an Arellano-Bond dynamic panel. 
The second includes a squared transparency index variable in the equation to look for 
diminishing returns to transparency. Financial depth, measured as M2/GDP, inflation, and the 
unemployment rate are included as control variables in both models. 
Transparency Model 
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝛽𝛽1𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 +  𝛽𝛽2𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3 + 𝛽𝛽4𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4 +  𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 +  𝜐𝜐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  
Where, 
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = financial market volatility 
𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 = transparency index 
𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 = financial depth 
𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3 = past inflation 
𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4 = unemployment rate 
𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 = unobserved effect 
𝜐𝜐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = error term 
Though other models will be tested for comparison and validity, the model is presented in fixed 
effects form as this should be the best fit for the data. I conjecture that all of the coefficients of 
the parameters on the regressors will be positive with the exception of transparency index, which 
I conjecture will be a negative relationship. 
Optimal Transparency Model 
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𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝛽𝛽1𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 +  𝛽𝛽2𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 + 𝛽𝛽4𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3 +  𝛽𝛽5𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4 +  𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 +  𝜐𝜐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  
Where, 
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = financial market volatility 
𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 = transparency index 
𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 = financial depth 
𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3 = past inflation 
𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4 = unemployment rate 
𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 = unobserved effect 
𝜐𝜐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = error term 
Again the model is presented in fixed effects form. I conjecture that all of the coefficients of the 
parameters on the regressors will be positive with the exception of transparency index, which I 
conjecture will be a negative relationship. The positive coefficient on the squared term should 
indicate the diminishing returns to transparency and therefore that some optimal level of 
transparency exists. 
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iii. Methodology 
 
My methodology is thorough and compares FE, random effects (RE), two-stage least 
squares (2SLS) and GMM models in order to find the most consistent and least biased estimators 
for each of the four models. In order to address the problem of endogeneity, I also utilize IV 
prior to estimation of the models.  
 A joint factor may exist that reduces volatility and increases transparency at the same 
time. It may be that more transparent democracies have more stable levels of output and financial 
markets. Systematic reasons having to do with a country’s economic structure, political structure, 
or history may exist, which is why a particular country’s central bank might be more or less 
transparent. This is important to the research because it means there could be omitted variable 
bias. Adding control variables to the equations presented will help mitigate the problem as will 
some of the methods expounded in this section.  
IV methods provide consistent estimation when explanatory variables are correlated with 
the error term, which often happens when there are relevant explanatory variables missing from a 
model or if there is measurement error. If an instrument is available, the regression estimates will 
no longer suffer from bias and inconsistency. There are two main requirements for using IV: the 
instrument must be correlated with the endogenous explanatory variable(s); and the instrument 
cannot be correlated with the error term. Often lags of the endogenous variable(s) are utilized. I 
follow Dincer and Eichengreen (2007) and use rule of law as an IV as well as lags of the 
endogenous variables. I then adjust the standard errors for heteroskedasticity and confirm 
whether or not serial correlation exists.  
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 The IV technique consistently estimates parameters when one or more explanatory 
variables are endogenous. This method is often followed with 2SLS, which allows one to include 
more IVs than there are explanatory variables. The first stage of the 2SLS technique involves 
estimating the reduced form by regressing each endogenous variable acting as a regressor in the 
equation being estimated on all the exogenous variables in the system of simultaneous equations, 
and then calculate the estimated values of these endogenous variables. In the second stage, one 
uses the estimated values as instrumental variables for the endogenous variables. An alternate 
way would be to use the estimated values and the included exogenous variables as regressors in 
an OLS regression.  
By utilizing panel data rather than a cross section, I am able to use earlier time periods to 
examine dynamic relationships in the data. The advantage of using panel data versus cross 
section is that it enables me to observe repeated observations for the same countries and uncover 
variation in the data that would not be apparent with neither time series nor cross section. Panel 
data allows for the inclusion of country fixed effects. 
 Panel data have both space and time dimensions. If each cross-sectional country has the 
same number of time series observations then the panel will be balanced. The panel is 
unbalanced if the number of observations across countries differs. Given that panel data have 
both time and space dimensions, one needs to use caution when estimating and make 
assumptions about the intercept, slope coefficients, and the error term. There are five 
possibilities: the intercept and slope coefficients are constant across time and space; slope 
coefficients are constant, but the intercept varies across individuals; slope coefficients are 
constant, but the intercept varies over individuals and time; the intercept and slope coefficients 
vary across individuals and time; the intercept and slope coefficients vary across individuals. The 
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scenario which the data behave most like will determine which model will give the best fit. With 
panel data, one cannot assume that the observations are independently distributed across time; 
there may be unobserved factors in year t-1 that affect X, which also affect X in time period t.  
 There are a variety of methods available to examine panel data. Pooling the data and 
using OLS is a standard method of estimation and serial correlation is not a concern since the 
samples are independent across time. Pooled regression is the simplest way to handle panel data, 
however it is often an oversimplification. Pooled regressions ignore the space and time 
dimensions of the data and simply pool the data and use OLS. If all estimated parameters are 
constant over time and countries then this would be an acceptable method. If there is strict 
exogeneity, a general differenced model can be estimated, using time period dummies in addition 
to the intercept. However, if after eliminating the unobserved effect by differencing, the reality is 
that the model suffers from endogeneity then our resulting estimators will be biased and 
inconsistent.  
 If the panel data models contain unobserved effects, the FE or RE estimators are more 
applicable. The FE, or the within, estimator also uses a transformation to remove unobserved 
effects from the equation before estimation. FE models allow the intercept to vary across 
individuals, while the slope coefficients remain constant across countries. This is usually 
depicted with a subscript i on the intercept term to show that intercepts across individuals may be 
vary. However, it is important to note that in this case the intercepts as well as the slope 
coefficients are still time invariant. FE allows us to model for country-specific effects by 
including differential intercept dummies. However, one could also use dummy variables to 
model differences over time with the inclusion of time dummies. In this circumstance we would 
denote these with the subscript t. Moreover, you could model the equation to have slope 
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coefficients that are constant, but allow the intercept to vary over individuals as well as over 
time. This would capture individual country effects as well as time effects. One final 
consideration is if all coefficients on both intercepts and slopes vary across all individuals. In this 
circumstance it might be prudent to include interactive or differential slope dummies, which 
would involve including the product of each country dummy with each of the exogenous 
variables.  
 There are a few potential problems that could arise with the above method. The model 
could suffer from the loss of degrees of freedom by introducing too many dummy variables. In 
addition, with the addition of numerous other variables the issue of multicollinearity could arise. 
Perhaps most importantly are the potential problems that arise with our error term, uit . The error 
term is affected by both cross-sectional observations, i, and to time series observations, t. The 
practitioner could assume that the error variance is the same for all cross-sectional units or we 
may need to assume that the error variance is heteroskedastic. We may also need to assume that 
there is no autocorrelation over time for each individual, or we could assume that the correlation 
follows an AR(1) process. It is also possible that the error term for one country is correlated with 
the error term for another country. Depending on which problems arise, it might be best to use 
the RE model instead.  
 An FE model attempts to remove unobserved effects from the error term with the use of 
dummy variables. RE leaves the unobserved effects in the error term, therefore keeping them as 
‘random’. Instead of treating an intercept as fixed, we assume that there is a mean value for the 
intercept and that we can separate the country-specific error associated with the intercept. By 
doing this we treat the intercept as an average value for all countries and that any differences in 
the intercept values of each country would be incorporated into the error term. Combining both 
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the traditional error term, uit , with our individual-specific and unobservable error term, which is 
removed from the intercept, will yield a combined new error term:  
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖 +  𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
This is why the RE model is also referred to as the error components model. Here we assume 
that the individual error components are not correlated with each other and that they are not 
autocorrelated across both cross-section and time series units. If the error term 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is 
heteroskedastic, which it is likely to be, then we should use generalized least squares (GLS) for 
estimation.  
 Determining whether to use FE or RE depends on the assumptions we make about the 
correlation between the cross-section specific error, 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖, and the regressors. If 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖 and the 
regressors are uncorrelated then RE is appropriate; if 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖 and the regressors are correlated then FE 
should probably be used. The Hausman test is vital in determining which way to model the error. 
Hausman null states that the RE and FE estimators do not differ substantially; if we reject the 
null hypothesis, it may be best to use FE.   
 FE is efficient when the errors are homoskedastic, serially uncorrelated, and if we make 
no assumptions about correlation between the unobserved effect and the explanatory variables. 
Any time-constant variables drop out of the analysis, as they do with differencing. RE estimators 
are applicable if the unobserved effect is uncorrelated with all the explanatory variables. If this is 
the case, the practitioner can leave the unobserved effect in the error term and serial correlation 
can be mitigated using GLS estimation. 
 Judge et al (1982) describes circumstances where one model may be preferred to the 
other. If the number of time series data, T, is large and the number of cross-sectional units, N, is 
small there is likely to be little difference between the two methods and one should use FE for 
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convenience. If N is large and T is small and if underlying RE assumptions hold then RE 
estimators are more efficient than FE estimators. When N is large and T is small, estimates from 
the two models can differ significantly – if it is strongly believed that the cross-sectional units in 
the sample are not random drawings from a larger sample then FE is appropriate; however, if it is 
strongly believed that the units are random drawings then RE is applicable. Finally, if the 
individual error, 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖, and one or more regressors are correlated then using RE will yield biased 
results and we should opt for the unbiased FE estimators.  
 Baltagi and Kao (2001) gives a starting point for handling panel data. The authors state to 
begin by testing the null that the intercepts are equal; if the null is not rejected then the data are 
pooled and we use OLS. If you do reject the null, a Hausman test is applied to determine if RE 
estimators are unbiased. If the null is not rejected, then we use RE; if the null is rejected then we 
use FE. It is common to use a FE model for data similar to what I examine in this research.   
 Arellano and Bond (1991) provide the following model for estimation:   y𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1𝛾𝛾 + 𝐗𝐗𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝛽𝛽 + u𝑖𝑖 +  𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
For  i = { 1,…, N} and t = {1,…, T} using datasets with large N and small T. 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 is correlated 
with the unobserved country-level effect u𝑖𝑖. Removing u𝑖𝑖 using the within transformation and 
removing the panel-level means will yield an inconsistent estimator. We need to first difference 
both sides of the equation and look for IVs and GMM estimators. First differencing our initial 
model gives us: 
𝛥𝛥𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝛥𝛥𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 𝛾𝛾 + 𝛥𝛥𝐗𝐗𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝛽𝛽 + 𝛥𝛥𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  
First differencing eliminates the u𝑖𝑖 from the model. However, first differencing also leaves  
𝛥𝛥𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1  correlated with 𝛥𝛥𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 . In order to correct for this, Anderson and Hsiao (1981) suggest using 
54 
a 2SLS estimator with further lags of 𝛥𝛥𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ( i.e. 𝛥𝛥𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−2) to instrument for 𝛥𝛥𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 . The authors 
also suggest using lagged levels of 𝛥𝛥𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (i.e. 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−2 ).  
Bond (2002) considers single equation models with autoregressive-distributed lag 
dynamics and potentially predetermined explanatory variables where the process generating the 
series are not completely specified. He expounds utilizing the GMM estimator to take 
endogeneity into account and focuses on panels where there are a large number of individuals, 
firms, or countries (N) over a small time period (T). Bond illustrates a simple, lagged AR(1) 
model:  
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = ∝ 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−1 + (η𝑖𝑖 + 𝜐𝜐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖); |𝛼𝛼| < 1; 𝑖𝑖 = 1, 2, … , N; 𝑡𝑡 = 2, 3, … , T 
Here 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is an observation for some series for individual i in period t, 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−1 is the corresponding 
observation for the same series for the same individual in the previous period, η𝑖𝑖 is the 
unobserved individual-specific and time-invariant effect that allows for heterogeneity in the 
means of the 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 series across individuals, and 𝜐𝜐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the error term. He assumes that the errors 
(𝜐𝜐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) are independent across individuals and that they are serially uncorrelated. Bond treats the 
individual effects (η𝑖𝑖) as stochastic, which means that they are correlated with the lagged 
dependent variable (𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−1) unless the distribution of the η𝑖𝑖 is degenerate. Since the lagged 
dependent variable is positively correlated with the error term because of the presence of 
individual effects, using OLS would yield inconsistent estimators. Bond suggests using the 
Within Groups (WG) estimator to eliminate this inconsistency by transforming the equation and 
eliminating η𝑖𝑖. However, the WG estimator will be biased downwards. Since both the OLS and 
WG estimators are likely biased in opposite directions, we hope that we can utilize other 
methods to find a consistent estimator that lies between the OLS and WG estimate.  
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 Roodman (2006) reviews linear GMM estimators designed for a large number of 
observations over a small time period. He compares the models presented in Arellano and Bond 
(1991), Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) and guides the reader through 
the steps and tests of various programs in Stata, in particular the indispensable xtabond2. 
Roodman considers endogenous variables that are correlated with past and current realizations of 
the error, fixed effects models, the use of time dummies, and heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation within observations. He surveys different variations of GMM estimators as well 
as the test for autocorrelation developed by Arellano and Bond (1991), which is useful when 
using lags as instruments for linear GMM regressions. Another central problem that Roodman 
covers is the problem of overidentified models, where instruments outnumber parameters; he 
discusses the Sargan and Hansen tests for overidentifying restrictions. Finally, Roodman 
cautions to remember the assumptions required for system GMM; in particular, the validity of 
instruments depends on the critical assumption that any changes in the instrumenting variables 
are uncorrelated with the fixed effects.  
 With GMM the practitioner uses theory to generate a set of moment restrictions. OLS is a 
special case of GMM where it is assumed that there is no correlation between the error term and 
the exogenous variables. GMM chooses parameter estimates to fit the theoretical model as 
closely as possible; the estimates are chosen so that they minimize the weighted distance 
between the actual and theoretical values. GMM is useful to uncover parameters. It is also used 
to correct for both heteroskedasticity as well as serial correlation. The method works in a similar 
way to 2SLS in that one needs to specify the instrument list and requires that we have more 
cross-section observations than time series periods. The GMM method requires that the sample 
correlations between exogenous variables and instruments are as close to zero as possible, or that 
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the orthogonality conditions are satisfied. Using a dynamic panel and GMM allows the 
practitioner to model the partial adjustment of the dependent variable. The coefficient on the 
lagged dependent variable measures the speed of the adjustment.  
 
 
 
 
IV. Data Selection 
There are several central bank transparency indices in the literature, but I believe that the 
Dincer and Eichengreen (2013) is the most comprehensive, informative and influential index 
compiled to date. It describes the changes in transparency over a 13-year period for 120 central 
banks around the world. However, I will also review a few of the alternative important 
contributions below. I will then describe the merits of the transparency index chosen as well as 
explain other data included in the financial market and output research.  
Fry et al. (2000) provide data on monetary policy frameworks with a thorough survey of 
94 central banks. Before the Dincer and Eichengreen (2007) index of 100 central banks, this was 
by far the vastest study. They construct several indices, including a measure of policy 
explanations based on: the prompt explanation of policy decisions, discussions in central bank 
bulletins, minutes and voting records; the frequency and publication of forward-looking analysis, 
risks to forecasts and forecast errors; and the explanation of assessment and analysis, frequency 
of bulletins, speeches and research papers. While this is an extensive survey of central banks, the 
limitations here are the use of only three aspects of transparency and that the data are for 1998.  
Additional, though more narrow, indices are briefly mentioned here. Bini-Smaghi and 
Gros (2001) consider 15 aspects of transparency for four countries: the Federal Reserve, the 
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Bank of England, the Bank of Japan, and the European Central Bank. De Haan, Amtembrink and 
Waller (2004) also look at the 15 point index but for six countries. Siklos (2002) expands this to 
cover 20 central banks, all from advanced industrial countries.  
Eijffinger and Geraats (2002) review another index that covers the five aspects of 
transparency: political (formal objectives, quantitative targets, and institutional arrangements), 
economic (economic data, policy models, and central bank forecasts), procedural (monetary 
policy strategy, minutes, and voting records), policy (prompt announcement and explanation of 
policy decisions and policy inclinations), and operational transparency (control errors, 
transmission shocks, and monetary policy evaluation). In this study, Eijffinger and Geraats look 
at nine central banks. Eijffinger and Geraats (2006) also consider 15 aspects of central bank 
transparency for nine central banks.  
Dincer and Eichengreen (2007) feel that the Eijffinger and Geraats (2006) 15 point index 
is comprehensive and a multidimensional definition of transparency. They also point out that 
most existing empirical research does not agree nor come to consistent conclusions. Moreover, 
many of the indices are based on very limited central bank samples or have data for a single 
point in time. Unlike panels, cross sectional data do not allow the inclusion of country fixed 
effects, which is troubling because the correlation between transparency and economic outcomes 
might actually be picking up effects of other country characteristics instead. Furthermore, 
theoretically there are reasons, having to do with a country’s history or economic structure, why 
a central bank may choose a level of transparency. Dincer and Eichengreen state that for a study 
to be convincing that it would need to take these systematic reasons into account as well.  
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Geraats (2002) gives us a definition for the five main aspects of central bank 
transparency4: 
1. Political transparency: refers to openness about policy objectives and institutional 
arrangements that clarify the motives of monetary policy makers. This could include 
explicit inflation targets, central bank independence and contracts. Opposite of 
transparency would be asymmetric information about policy makers’ preferences. 
 
2. Economic transparency: focuses on the economic information that is used for monetary 
policy, including economic data, policy models and central bank forecasts. 
 
 
3. Procedural transparency: describes the way monetary policy decisions are taken. This 
includes the monetary policy strategy and an account of policy deliberations, typically 
through minutes and voting records. 
 
4. Policy transparency: means a prompt announcement and explanation of policy decisions, 
and an indication of likely future policy actions in the form of a policy inclination. 
 
5. Operational transparency: concerns the implementation of monetary policy actions, 
including a discussion of control errors for the operating instrument and macroeconomic 
transmission disturbances. 
 
The transparency index utilized in my research is Dincer and Eichengreen’s (2013) index, 
which surveys 120 central banks from 1998 through 20105. The index ranges in numerical value 
from 0 to 15 with 0 being the most opaque and 15 the most transparent. It is a replication and 
extension of Eijffinger and Geraats (2006), which takes data from central banks’ websites, their 
statutes, annual reports, and other published documents and compiles the information into 15 
subindices6. Dincer and Eichengreen compile their data into the five categories from Geraats 
(2002) mentioned above. The data includes all of the central banks in the world with the 
exception of Bolivia, Ecuador, Chad, and Afghanistan. First, we will consider the characteristics 
of the index compiled by Dincer and Eichengreen before we discuss the other data utilized.  
                                                 
4 See Figure 1 in the Appendix for a visual overview of how these five aspects are related.  
5 See Tables 1 and 2 in the Appendix. 
6 See Data Appendix in the Appendix.  
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When reviewing the regional weighted transparency7, we see that all regions have moved 
to a higher level of transparency over the period studied with the exception of Middle Africa, 
which exhibits no change. The greatest sub-regional change is in South-East Asia (2.95 to 8.19), 
while the sub-region with the least amount of change is Eastern Asia (6.48 to 7.23). The region 
with the greatest increase in transparency is Oceania (8.2 to 11.23); the region with the smallest 
increase is Asia (5.54 to 6.73).  
 With the exception of Africa and Oceania, all regions’ highest level of transparency is not 
in the most recent year.8 Africa’s highest level of transparency was in 2010 (5.8), Americas’ was 
in 2006 (10.23), Asia’s was in 2004 (7.15), Europe’s was in 2004 (10.69), and Oceania’s was in 
2010 (11.23). This move away from the peak of transparency could suggest, albeit in the 
slightest way, that central banks realized that there could be too much openness. Taking an 
average of all main regions, we find that transparency increases from 6.572 in 1998, to a high of 
8.848 in 2010.9  
 If we move away from the weighted index and review general transparency10, we witness 
moves towards greater transparency by most individual countries11. Angola, Bahamas, Cayman 
Islands, Cuba, Bermuda, Iran, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Syria, and Solomon Islands 
have no increase in transparency over the 13-year period. However, it is important to note that 
only Uruguay displays a decrease in transparency over the period studied. Hungary displays the 
greatest increase (3.5 to 13.5), Eastern Europe is the sub-region with the highest increase (3.5 to 
7.6), and Europe is the region with the greatest increase (5.3 to 8.4). Cayman Islands is the least 
transparent country with a value of 0 for the entire period of study. Sweden has the highest 
                                                 
7 See Table 2 in the Appendix. 
8 See Figures 3 through 8 in the Appendix.  
9 See Figure 9 in the Appendix. 
10 See Table 1 in the Appendix. 
11 See Figure 2 in the Appendix.  
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amount of transparency, which ranges from 9.0 in 1998 to a chart-topping high of 14.5 in 2010. 
Considering the average transparency score by year, we see a steady increase from a value of 3.3 
to 5.7 from 1998 to 2010.  
 Following Dincer and Eichengreen (2007), the measure of output volatility is the 
standard deviation of the growth rate over the most recent three-year period (the current calendar 
year and its two immediate predecessors). However, since the typical business cycle in more 
developed countries is longer, output volatility is also measured as the standard deviation of the 
growth rate over the most recent five-year period for comparison. The data is limited to this 
volatility configuration because annual data exists for the broadest sample of countries; quarterly 
data is available for a limited set only.  
 Čihák, Demirgüç-Kunt, Feyen, and Levine (2012) introduce The World Bank’s Global 
Financial Development Database (GFDD) of financial system characteristics for 205 economies 
from 1960 to 2010. The database includes measures of the size of financial institutions and 
markets (measuring financial depth), degree to which individuals can and do use financial 
services (measuring access), efficiency of financial intermediaries and markets in intermediating 
resources and facilitating financial transactions (measuring efficiency), and stability of financial 
institutions and markets (measuring stability). The authors include measures for both financial 
institutions as well as both equity and bond financial markets. I utilize the November 2013 
version of The World Bank’s (GFDD). The database is a wealth of information and provides a 
variable to measure M2 to GDP (to measure financial depth) as well as a variable to measure the 
volatility of stock price indices, where available. The volatility of stock price index variable is 
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measured as the 360-day standard deviation of the return on the national stock market index and 
is an annual variable. It provides us with a good measure of domestic stock market stability.12  
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
V. Empirical Testing and Findings 
 When examining the below diagram displaying the relationship between output volatility 
and the level of transparency, it is evident that as the level of central bank transparency increases 
the output volatility decreases overall. The highest level of output volatility is associated with the 
least transparent central banks. 
                                                 
12 See Data Index in the Appendix for a detailed identification of variables and their measurements. 
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The extreme outliers here are Iraq (2.5, 36.17), (2.5, 35.87), and (2.5, 21.77); Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (3.0, 31.11); and Armenia (8.5, 21.54), and (7.5 21.10).   
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The extreme outliers here are Bosnia and Herzegovina (3.0, 30.71), (3.0, 29.12), and (3.0, 
28.74); Rwanda (1.0, 28.69); and Iraq (2.5, 28.12), (2.5, 28.11), (2.5, 28.04), (2.5, 27.79), and 
(2.0, 20.96). 
 Moreover, the diagram displaying the relationship between financial market volatility and 
the level of transparency is even more telling. As central bank transparency increases, the level 
of financial market volatility drastically decreases although it tends to zero much less than output 
volatility does. Again we see that the highest level of financial market volatility is associated 
with the least transparent central banks.   
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Mongolia represents the most extreme outliers here with data points of (4.0, 141.58), (4.0, 
127.64), and (4.0, 121.36).  
 The summary of data below displays the wide range of values that the study utilizes 
across all four models.13 In order to standardize the transparency data, the values are normalized 
prior to econometric analysis. The new potential data range is from 1 to 10 with 1 being the least 
and 10 being the most transparent.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
13 Summaries of all variables are included in Tables 5 – 12 in the Appendix. 
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Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Obs 1560 780.5 450.4775 1 1560 
Country 1560 60.5 34.65092 1 120 
Year 1560 2004 3.742875 1998 2010 
Transparency 
Index 1560 4.716026 3.088101 0 14.5 
Normalized 
Transparency 
Index 1560 3.927188 1.916752 1 10 
Output 
Volatility (3yr) 1520 2.213046 2.653652 0 36.17792 
Output 
Volatility (5yr) 1525 2.802425 2.967505 0 30.71081 
Financial 
Depth 1482 61.81856 46.58257 6.723815 325.3392 
Past Inflation 1412 9.163403 33.84087 -10.06749 1058.374 
Financial 
Market 
Volatility 707 24.78227 13.77089 2.393469 141.5828 
Unemployment 
Rate 1097 9.061958 6.237902 .1 38.4 
Rule of Law 1305 0.067564 0.9331937 -1.923883 1.99964 
 
We can also see some of the preliminary relationships in the data by examining the correlations 
of transparency index (TI), normalized transparency index (NTI), three-year output volatility 
(OV3), five-year output volatility (OV5), financial depth (FD), past inflation (PI), financial 
market volatility (FMV), unemployment rate (UR) and the rule of law (RL) listed below.  
 YR TI NTI OV3 OV5 FD PI FMV UR RL 
YR 1.000          
TI 0.206 1.000         
NTI 0.206 1.000 1.000        
OV3 0.129 -0.126 -0.126 1.000       
OV5 0.070 -0.200 -0.200 0.862 1.000      
FD 0.083 0.235 0.235 -0.042 -0.091 1.000     
PI -0.079 -0.241 -0.241 0.255 0.288 -0.329 1.000    
FMV -0.034 -0.213 -0.213 0.298 0.308 -0.158 0.308 1.000   
UR 0.015 -0.126 -0.126 0.068 0.084 -0.271 0.088 -0.006 1.000  
RL -0.042 0.562 0.562 -0.130 -0.185 0.514 -0.367 -0.280 -0.300 1.000 
  
 Attention is now refocused from the preliminary analysis to pooled OLS, FE, RE, 2SLS 
and GMM models for both output and financial market volatility.  
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i. Output Model  
 
 Evaluating the preliminary pooled regression of output volatility provides a perfunctory 
view of the relationship between our variables. Since theory strongly suggests the models will 
suffer from endogeneity, this is solely a starting point and provides a glimpse at the fundamental 
relationships in the data. 
 The four pooled OLS fitted equations below utilize the normalized transparency index, 
which is used in all analysis going forward unless otherwise specified.  
Model Comparison of Output Volatility Pooled OLS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 OV3 OV5 OV3 OV5 
NTI -0.0817* -0.1666*** 0.1809 0.0440 
 (0.0365) (0.0383) (0.1432) (0.1503) 
     
FD -0.0006 -0.0029 -0.0005 -0.0028 
 (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0016) 
     
PI 0.0054** 0.0053** 0.0055** 0.0053** 
 (0.0019) (0.0020) (0.0019) (0.0020) 
     
NTI2   -0.0274 -0.0219 
   (0.0144) (0.0151) 
     
_cons 2.4081*** 3.4409*** 1.8907*** 3.0261*** 
 (0.1609) (0.1689) (0.3166) (0.3323) 
N 1378 1380 1378 1380 
r2 0.0118 0.0303 0.0144 0.0317 
F 
pvalue 
5.4765 
0.0010 
14.3094 
0.0000 
5.0146 
0.0005 
11.2655 
0.0000 
ll -3174.6516 -3246.2144 -3172.8485 -3245.1617 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Note: normalized transparency index (NTI), three-year output volatility (OV3), five-year output volatility (OV5), 
financial depth (FD), past inflation (PI), normalized transparency index squared (NTI2) 
 
The R-squared values are relatively low, which is not uncommon in microeconometric studies. 
While much of the variation in the models remains unexplained, the regressors are jointly 
statistically significant for each model based on the p-values of the overall F statistic. There are 
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also numerous variables in the equations that are either the incorrect sign or statistically 
insignificant, which is to be expected as the model is misspecified. Since pooled regressions 
ignore country-specific effects of panel data, we explore more complex models in order to 
capture the true data relationship. 
 The Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier test strongly implies the presence of 
heteroskedasticity for the above pooled OLS models. Heteroskedastically robust standard errors 
are therefore considered below, which improve the statistical significance of some of the 
parameter estimates on these preliminary models.  
Model Comparison of Output Volatility Pooled OLS with Heteroskedastically Robust Errors 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 OV3 OV5 OV3 OV5 
NTI -0.0817** -0.1666*** 0.1809 0.0440 
 (0.0309) (0.0306) (0.1119) (0.1285) 
     
FD -0.0006 -0.0029* -0.0005 -0.0028* 
 (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013) 
     
PI 0.0054** 0.0053* 0.0055** 0.0053* 
 (0.0018) (0.0026) (0.0019) (0.0026) 
     
NTI2   -0.0274** -0.0219 
   (0.0103) (0.0116) 
     
_cons 2.4081*** 3.4409*** 1.8907*** 3.0261*** 
 (0.1455) (0.1759) (0.2565) (0.3284) 
N 1378 1380 1378 1380 
r2 0.0118 0.0303 0.0144 0.0317 
F 
pvalue 
5.8817 
0.0005 
15.6238 
0.0000 
7.8274 
0.0000 
19.6742 
0.0000 
ll -3174.6516 -3246.2144 -3172.8485 -3245.1617 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Note: normalized transparency index (NTI), three-year output volatility (OV3), five-year output volatility (OV5), 
financial depth (FD), past inflation (PI), normalized transparency index squared (NTI2) 
 
 Attention is now turned to comparing FE and RE models, initially ignoring the issue of 
endogeneity in order to document the benefits of utilizing IV in the models. Determining 
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whether to use FE or RE depends on the assumptions made about the correlation between the 
cross-section specific error and the regressors. If 𝜐𝜐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 and the regressors are uncorrelated then RE 
is appropriate; however, if 𝜐𝜐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 and the regressors are correlated then FE models capture the 
relationship better. Econometric theory suggests that if the cross-sectional units in the sample are 
not random drawings from a larger sample then FE is applicable, as is the case with the data 
utilized in this study. RE would be useful if the unobserved effect is uncorrelated with all of the 
explanatory variables; however, if the error and one or more regressors are correlated then using 
RE will yield biased results. FE allows for arbitrary correlation between the unobserved effect, 
𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖, and our explanatory variables in any time period. The Hausman test is vital in determining 
which way to model the error. The Hausman test null states that the RE and FE estimators do not 
differ substantially; if we reject the null hypothesis, it may be best to use FE.   
 The below FE models do not account for the endogeneity problem; this estimation 
technique is explored later.  
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Model Comparison of Output Volatility Fixed Effects with Heteroskedastic Robust Errors 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 OV3 OV5 OV3 OV5 
NTI 0.0866 -0.0330 -0.1606 -0.4516 
 (0.1425) (0.1467) (0.2498) (0.2770) 
     
FD 0.0072 0.0014 0.0068 0.0007 
 (0.0084) (0.0075) (0.0083) (0.0075) 
     
PI 0.0048* 0.0034 0.0047* 0.0034 
 (0.0020) (0.0021) (0.0020) (0.0021) 
     
NTI2   0.0260 0.0441 
   (0.0193) (0.0223) 
     
_cons 1.2486* 2.6501*** 1.7526* 3.5036*** 
 (0.5587) (0.5026) (0.6919) (0.6760) 
N 1378 1380 1378 1380 
Within r2 
Between r2 
Overall r2 
0.0086 
0.0257 
0.0011 
0.0035 
0.0232 
0.0092 
0.0094 
0.0346 
0.0021 
0.0065 
0.0002 
0.0008 
F 
pvalue 
2.3438 
0.0767 
0.8896 
0.4489 
2.3992 
0.0542 
1.6487 
0.1669 
ll 
sigma_u 
sigma_e 
rho 
-2927.2205 
1.6686 
2.1172 
0.3831 
-2807.1652 
2.1330 
1.9347 
0.5486 
-2926.6258 
1.6786 
2.1171 
0.3860 
-2805.1195 
2.1492 
1.9326 
0.5529 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Note: normalized transparency index (NTI), three-year output volatility (OV3), five-year output volatility (OV5), 
financial depth (FD), past inflation (PI), normalized transparency index squared (NTI2) 
 
Sigma_u is the standard deviation of the individual effect, 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖, and sigma_e gives the standard 
deviation of the error, 𝜐𝜐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖. Rho is the intraclass correlation of the error. It is quite noticeable that 
the F-statistic is no longer significant and most of the variables are no longer statistically 
significant.  
 
 
 
 
70 
Model Comparison of Output Volatility Random Effects with Heteroskedastic Robust Errors 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 OV3 OV5 OV3 OV5 
NTI -0.0020 -0.0829 -0.0487 -0.3742 
 (0.0824) (0.1039) (0.1936) (0.2403) 
     
FD 0.0005 -0.0015 0.0005 -0.0018 
 (0.0025) (0.0037) (0.0025) (0.0037) 
     
PI 0.0048* 0.0036 0.0048* 0.0035 
 (0.0020) (0.0022) (0.0020) (0.0022) 
     
NTI2   0.0049 0.0306 
   (0.0172) (0.0211) 
     
_cons 2.0768*** 3.1523*** 2.1710*** 3.7365*** 
 (0.3306) (0.4626) (0.4694) (0.6380) 
N 
Within r2 
Between r2 
Overall r2 
Wald chi2 
pvalue 
1378 
0.0048 
0.0143 
0.0063 
6.06 
0.1086 
1380 
0.0028 
0.0738 
0.0299 
4.01 
0.2603 
1378 
0.0051 
0.0075 
0.0052 
6.27 
0.1802 
1380 
0.0052 
0.0387 
0.0173 
6.01 
0.1981 
sigma_u 1.3757 1.9893 1.3711 1.9933 
sigma_e 2.1172 1.9347 2.1171 1.9326 
rho 0.2969 0.5139 0.2955 0.5155 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Note: normalized transparency index (NTI), three-year output volatility (OV3), five-year output volatility (OV5), 
financial depth (FD), past inflation (PI), normalized transparency index squared (NTI2) 
 
The same models but with RE are considered above. Most of the coefficients are either 
insignificant and/or the wrong sign. The overall models are also not significant.  
 Consistent with theory, the Hausman test on all four model comparisons supports the 
rejection of the null hypothesis that RE provides consistent estimates. Therefore the analysis 
presented proceeds focusing only on FE models. In order to have consistency for least-squares 
estimators, one needs to assume that the error term of the model is not correlated with any of the 
regressors. If the assumption E(𝜐𝜐|x) = 0 does not hold then there is an endogeneity issue and the 
estimator is inconsistent. Introducing an IV will address this estimation problem.  
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 Before addressing the issue of endogeneity, it is important to confirm that there is indeed 
a problem. Below are the IV estimations for exactly identified models for both measures of 
output volatility along with their corresponding standard errors. Compared to the earlier pooled 
OLS regressions on output volatility, the results below are much more statistically significant. 
Importantly our IV, rule of law, is highly statistically significant. Normalized transparency has a 
large effect economically and is statistically significant.  
IV Regression for Output Volatility with Heteroskedastic Robust Errors 
 (1) (2) 
 OV3 OV5 
NTI -0.3200* -0.5115*** 
 (0.1248) (0.1295) 
   
FD 0.0027 0.0021 
 (0.0019) (0.0018) 
   
PI 0.0055** 0.0047* 
 (0.0019) (0.0023) 
   
_cons 3.2126*** 4.5949*** 
 (0.4815) (0.5156) 
N 
r2 
1167 
0.3249 
1169 
0.3241 
F 198.53 198.21 
pvalue 
Wald Chi2 
0.0000 
14.04 
0.0000 
25.48 
pvalue 0.0028 0.0000 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Note: normalized transparency index (NTI), three-year output volatility (OV3), five-year output volatility (OV5), 
financial depth (FD), past inflation (PI) 
 
 The Durbin-Wu-Hausman test is often employed to test whether or not a regressor is 
endogenous. If the regressor is indeed endogenous, the parameter estimates will still be 
consistent, but they will be much less efficient. Therefore, if there is negligible difference 
between the OLS and IV estimators then the variable is treated as exogenous and an IV is not 
necessary.  
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 Comparing our initial pooled OLS regressions with the above estimates, it is clear that 
the coefficient on NTI becomes much more economically significant (-0.081734 compared to -
0.319971 for OV3 and -0.166608 compared to -0.511456 for OV5); this supports the theory that 
normalized transparency index is endogenous. The loss of precision from utilizing IV is visibly 
reinforced by the increase in the standard errors (0.0309446 to 0.124786 for OV3 and 0.0306348 
to 0.1295012 for OV5). The Durbin-Wu-Hausman test leads to the rejection of the null 
hypothesis that NTI is exogenous for both output volatility models; therefore it is safe to 
conclude that the normalized transparency index is endogenous and the use of IV is appropriate.  
 Thus far, analysis has shown that the models suffer from endogeneity and FE estimation 
is preferred to RE. However, both of these cases have been considered independently. It is 
imperative to consider both FE and IV simultaneously in order to begin properly estimating the 
model and appreciate the data characteristics. Below, basic FE panel estimation with IV is 
considered for all four output models.  
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Instrumental Variable Fixed Effects Panel Model Comparison of Output Volatility  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 OV3 OV5 OV3 OV5 
NTI -1.1518 -10.4887 0.2091 -32.9222 
 (9.7230) (31.6435) (39.5953) (121.3684) 
     
FD 0.0411 0.2516 0.0603 -0.0677 
 (0.2302) (0.7509) (0.1546) (0.4719) 
     
PI 0.0047 -0.0018 0.0047 -0.0013 
 (0.0059) (0.0190) (0.0060) (0.0183) 
     
NTI2   -0.2100 3.4752 
   (4.4510) (13.6383) 
     
_cons 4.2678 30.5020 1.8342 70.5636 
 (26.0450) (84.6956) (80.3889) (246.4673) 
N 
Wald chi2 
pvalue 
1167 
909.15 
0.0000 
1169 
139.07 
0.0000 
1167 
739.47 
0.0000 
1169 
124.59 
0.0000 
sigma_u 2.7644 18.6312 3.8589 14.2932 
sigma_e 2.3942 7.6601 2.6583 8.1023 
rho 0.5714 0.8554 0.6782 0.7568 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Note: normalized transparency index (NTI), three-year output volatility (OV3), five-year output volatility (OV5), 
financial depth (FD), past inflation (PI), normalized transparency index squared (NTI2) 
 
The rule of law is used as an instrument for the normalized transparency index, while past 
inflation squared is used as an instrument for the normalized transparency index squared. 
Interpreting the fourth regression, the estimates imply that five-year output volatility decreases 
by 32.9222 for each additional unit increase of transparency, though the coefficient is 
statistically insignificant and a little large in value to be plausible. Estimates also suggest that 
output volatility will decrease to a minimum at a value of 4.7367 level of transparency [= 
32.9222 / (2 x 3.4752)], after which output volatility may begin to increase.  
 To more easily compare these optimal transparency results, the results are rerun with the 
original, non-normalized Dincer and Eichengreen index, which allows review of which countries 
and regions have transparency levels beyond the potential optimum point.  
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Instrumental Variable Fixed Effects Panel Model Comparison of Output Volatility with Original 
Transparency Index 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 OV3 OV5 OV3 OV5 
TI -0.7149 -6.5102 -0.1309 -16.1204 
 (6.0350) (19.6408) (19.0542) (58.4116) 
     
FD 0.0411 0.2516 0.0603 -0.0677 
 (0.2302) (0.7509) (0.1546) (0.4719) 
     
PI 0.0047 -0.0018 0.0047 -0.0013 
 (0.0059) (0.0190) (0.0060) (0.0183) 
     
TI2   -0.0809 1.3388 
   (1.7148) (5.2543) 
     
_cons 3.1160 20.0133 1.8333 41.1167 
 (16.3236) (53.0572) (45.2443) (138.7365) 
N 
Wald chi2 
pvalue 
1167 
909.15 
0.0000 
1169 
139.07 
0.0000 
1167 
739.47 
0.0000 
1169 
124.59 
0.0000 
sigma_u 2.7644 18.6312 3.8589 14.2932 
sigma_e 2.3942 7.6601 2.6583 8.1023 
rho 0.5714 0.8554 0.6782 0.7568 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Note: transparency index (TI), three-year output volatility (OV3), five-year output volatility (OV5), financial depth 
(FD), past inflation (PI), transparency index squared (TI2) 
 
Interpreting the fourth regression again, the estimates imply that five-year output volatility 
decreases by 16.1204 for each additional unit increase of transparency, though the coefficient is 
statistically insignificant. Estimates also suggest that output volatility will decrease to a 
minimum at a value of 6.0205 level of transparency [= 16.1204 / (2 x 1.3388)], after which 
output volatility may begin to increase. This is a marked increase to minimal optimal level of 
transparency previously found when examining the same model but with the normalized 
transparency index, suggesting fewer countries’ and regions’ central banks may operate at levels 
of transparency that exacerbate output volatility.  
 While most of the parameter estimates of the normalized transparency index regressions 
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have the correct sign, it is evident that there are no longer statistically significant estimates. The 
standard errors are much larger than with previous estimates; the IV regression leads to a 
substantial loss in estimator efficiency here. Moreover, the coefficients, signs of coefficients, and 
conclusions drawn from the estimates are not consistent with theory. However, the small p-value 
from the test concludes that at least one of the regression coefficients is not equal to zero in each 
model. There may be a problem with the IV chosen; it is therefore imperative to consider the 
Arellano-Bond estimator, which uses lags of the dependent variable to identify a more proper 
model.  
 The general, autoregressive, dynamic model for Arellano-Bond estimation is: 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝛾𝛾1𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−1+ . . . + 𝛾𝛾𝑝𝑝𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−𝑝𝑝 + 𝐱𝐱′𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝛽𝛽 +  𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 +  𝜐𝜐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, t = p + 1, …, T 
The above equation allows for many reasons of potential correlation in y over time, one of which 
being unobserved heterogeneity which is observed through the time-invariant individual country 
effect 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖. The Arellano-Bond estimator focuses on FE models with short panels where there is at 
least one lag of the dependent variable included as a regressor. In this case, the fixed effect, 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖, 
needs to be eliminated by first-differencing instead of mean-differencing. The FE estimator will 
be inconsistent once lagged regressors (IV) are added to the model. Therefore the first-difference 
(FD) model is estimated; if the FD model utilizes appropriate lags of 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 as instruments then the 
IV estimators will lead to consistent parameter estimates. Anderson and Hsiao (1981) suggest 
performing IV estimation with 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−2 as an instrument for 𝛥𝛥𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−1 since it is uncorrelated with 
𝛥𝛥𝜐𝜐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖. However, with lagged dependent variables, one needs to check the model for serially 
correlated error. If serial correlation is present then the parameter estimates are inconsistent. 
Heteroskedastic-consistent estimates of the variance-covariance matrix of the estimator are 
ensured by using heteroskedastic robust standard errors in the estimation.  
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 Below are the 2SLS estimates for output volatility. Each model strongly rejects the 
presence of serial correlation, therefore the estimations are consistent. Lags of output volatility, 
normalized transparency, and, where applicable, normalized transparency squared are used to 
identify the model and control for endogeneity. 
2SLS Arellano-Bond Model Comparison of Output Volatility with  
Heteroskedastic Robust Errors 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 OV3 OV5 OV3 OV5 
NTI -0.2238 -0.1787 -1.1567* -0.7416* 
 (0.2660) (0.2407) (0.6219) (0.3880) 
     
FD 0.0290*** 0.0176* 0.0118 0.0038 
 (0.0107) (0.0093) (0.0100) (0.0073) 
     
PI 0.0075 0.0131 0.0076 0.0132 
 (0.0137) (0.0138) (0.0134) (0.0138) 
     
NTI2   0.1296** 0.0885** 
   (0.0639) (0.0410) 
     
_cons 0.1437 0.2283 2.3778 1.5683 
 (0.8123) (0.5378) (1.7084) (1.0043) 
N 1052 1054 1052 1054 
Wald chi2 340.98 486.66 338.54 503.83 
pvalue 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001 
Note: normalized transparency index (NTI), three-year output volatility (OV3), five-year output volatility (OV5), 
financial depth (FD), past inflation (PI), normalized transparency index squared (NTI2) 
 
The coefficients on the estimated parameters are all the correct sign, while not all of the pertinent 
regressors are significant. Moreover, all of the corresponding Wald test statistics indicate very 
strong significance for these one-step models. 
 The two-step, GMM model is now considered and estimates are presented below. Each 
model strongly rejects the presence of serial correlation, therefore the estimations are consistent. 
As with the 2SLS estimations, lags of output volatility, normalized transparency, and, where 
applicable, normalized transparency squared are used to identify the model and control for 
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endogeneity. Coefficients on the estimated parameters are all the anticipated signs and output 
volatility models including a squared variable of the normalized transparency index have 
statistically significant key regressors. All of the Wald test statistics indicate very strong 
significance for the models.  
GMM Arellano-Bond Model Comparison of Output Volatility with  
Heteroskedastic Robust Errors 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 OV3 OV5 OV3 OV5 
NTI -0.1622 -0.2262 -1.1353** -0.7101** 
 (0.2476) (0.2565) (0.4831) (0.3412) 
     
FD 0.0271** 0.0182* 0.0090 0.0030 
 (0.0120) (0.0108) (0.0096) (0.0073) 
     
PI 0.0085 0.0186 0.0063 0.0167 
 (0.0139) (0.0176) (0.0129) (0.0154) 
     
NTI2   0.1312** 0.0851** 
   (0.0511) (0.0373) 
     
_cons -0.1067 0.2312 2.3688* 1.5071* 
 (0.7414) (0.5280) (1.2849) (0.8682) 
N 1052 1054 1052 1054 
Wald chi2 222.98 341.18 257.36 369.70 
pvalue 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001 
Note: normalized transparency index (NTI), three-year output volatility (OV3), five-year output volatility (OV5), 
financial depth (FD), past inflation (PI), normalized transparency index squared (NTI2) 
 
 As anticipated, GMM estimation produces the best estimates of the output volatility 
model. GMM allows for panel data characteristics via FD, IV, corrects for serial correlation and 
heterogeneity. Both measures of output volatility (three-year and five-year) regressed on 
normalized transparency, normalized transparency squared, financial depth, and past inflation 
yield estimated models that are both significant and produce coefficients of anticipated signs. 
 Since one of the main questions this research seeks to answer is whether or not there is an 
optimal level of transparency, it is apropos that both models that account for diminishing benefits 
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of transparency are the most significant and applicable. Models of output volatility without the 
squared normalized transparency term do not appear to be correctly specified under any of the 
estimation methods considered in this section; this is further evidence that output volatility needs 
to be modeled with a squared transparency variable.  
 Considering each variable on its own, as predicted from previous studies and theory, the 
control variables, past inflation and financial depth, are neither economically nor statistically 
significant. However, as with control variables in many microeconometric studies, their inclusion 
in the model allows for more appropriate specification. The coefficients on the normalized 
transparency index variables are negative for both models, indicating that as the level of 
transparency increases output volatility will decrease. As predicted, the coefficients on the 
squared normalized transparency index variables are positive for both models, suggesting that 
there could be diminishing returns to transparency. Constant terms for both models are also the 
anticipated sign, but only statistically significant at the 10% level.  
 Considering the estimated coefficients on the model of output volatility (three-year) 
allows the first glance at the relationship between transparency and output volatility. The 
coefficient on normalized transparency indicates that as normalized transparency increases by 
one unit that output volatility decreases by 1.135 units. Taking the squared transparency term 
into account allows one to estimate the optimal level of transparency. Evaluating the minimum 
point given the coefficients yields a value of 4.33 [= 1.135348 / (2 x 0.1312451)]. As there are 
numerous data points to the right of the potential minimum of 4.33, there is strong evidence that 
there may exist an optimal level of transparency. Theory here suggests that once past a level of 
transparency of 4.33 that there may exist diminishing returns to transparency. On the other hand, 
given that there are numerous countries that have sustained transparency levels above this 
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threshold, one should be reserved when considering the potential impact of this finding. 
Additional analysis and possible explanations are provided in the Additional Results portion of 
this section, where the same models are considered with only developed countries rather than all 
120 included in the index.  
 Considering the estimated values on the model of output volatility (five-year) allows 
further inspection of the effect of transparency levels on output volatility. The coefficient on 
normalized transparency implies that as normalized transparency increases by one unit that 
output volatility decreases by 0.71 units. Evaluating the minimum point yields a values of 4.17 
[= 0.7101057 / (2 x 0.0851442)]. As with the minimum point for the other measure of output 
volatility, there are numerous data points to the right of this potential minimum of 4.17. This 
provides a strong indication that there may be an optimal level of transparency.  
 For ease in comparing these optimal transparency results, the results are rerun with the 
original, non-normalized Dincer and Eichengreen index, which allows review of which countries 
and regions have transparency levels beyond the potential optimum point. 
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GMM Arellano-Bond Model Comparison of Output Volatility with  
Heteroskedastic Robust Errors and Original Transparency Index 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 OV3 OV5 OV3 OV5 
TI -0.1130 -0.1740 -0.7475** -0.5608** 
 (0.1687) (0.1791) (0.3248) (0.2844) 
     
FD 0.0271** 0.0186* 0.0095 0.0021 
 (0.0116) (0.0108) (0.0094) (0.0065) 
     
PI 0.0082 0.0194 0.0062 0.0163 
 (0.0136) (0.0175) (0.0126) (0.0159) 
     
TI2   0.0650** 0.0486** 
   (0.0265) (0.0217) 
     
_cons -0.2134 0.1470 1.8506* 1.5378* 
 (0.6421) (0.4363) (1.1128) (0.8719) 
N 1052 1054 1052 1054 
Wald chi2 201.68 302.27 230.07 362.22 
pvalue 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001 
Note: transparency index (TI), three-year output volatility (OV3), five-year output volatility (OV5), financial depth 
(FD), past inflation (PI), transparency index squared (TI2) 
 
Examining output volatility (three-year), the estimates imply that volatility decreases by 0.7475 
for each additional unit increase of transparency. Estimates also suggest that output volatility will 
decrease to a minimum at a value of 5.75 level of transparency [= 0.7475 / (2 x 0.0650)], after 
which output volatility may begin to increase. Considering output volatility (five-year) yields 
equally interesting results with volatility decreasing by 0.5608 for each additional unit of 
transparency to a potential minimum at a value of 5.77 level of transparency [= 0.5608 / (2 x 
0.0486)].  
 The question begs, if central banks minimize output volatility at such a low level (4.33, 
4.17, 5.75, or 5.77 depending on the model and variable used) then why do many central banks 
have transparency levels of well over this minimum, some even as high as non-normalized 
transparency levels of 14 or 14.5? Clearly there are a myriad of other important variables that 
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central banks examine, inflation and unemployment to name a few. While smoothing output 
growth is generally accepted to be welfare enhancing, it may not be the most important target for 
central banks. Moreover, more vital targets may be pursued to the detriment of output volatility 
targeting. Therefore while there may exist some optimum level of central bank transparency to 
minimize output, this point may be ignored and surpassed to attain other bank targets. Additional 
empirical evidence to support high levels of transparency is provided in the Additional Results 
portion of this section.  
 In conclusion, it is apparent that output volatility for both three-year and five-year 
measures is correctly modeled under the GMM framework. GMM allows for the use of FD 
estimation with IV while controlling for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. The models are 
correctly specified when squared terms of normalized transparency are included in the 
estimation, which is consistent with theory. This study contributes to central bank transparency 
research literature by indicating that increased levels of transparency will decrease the output 
volatility both measured over three and five-year periods. Moreover, following previous studies 
such as Dincer and Eichengreen (2007) and Mishkin (2004), evidence supporting an optimal 
level of transparency is also presented.  
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ii. Financial Market Model 
 
 In examining the preliminary linear regression of financial market volatility, the country-
specific effects are, again, ignored initially and the observations are pooled. The pooled OLS 
estimates provide a brief look at the potential relationship between our variables.  
Model Comparison of Financial Market Volatility Pooled OLS 
 (1) (2) 
 FMV FMV 
NTI -1.0529*** -2.6051* 
 (0.2831) (1.2411) 
   
FD -0.0134 -0.0132 
 (0.0117) (0.0117) 
   
PI 0.4547*** 0.4531*** 
 (0.0608) (0.0608) 
   
UR -0.1609 -0.1501 
 (0.1069) (0.1071) 
   
NTI2  0.1418 
  (0.1104) 
   
_cons 30.2028*** 33.7952*** 
 (2.2080) (3.5627) 
N 598 598 
r2 0.1498 0.1521 
F 
pvalue 
26.1118 
0.0000 
21.2423 
0.0000 
ll -2378.3890 -2377.5569 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Note: normalized transparency index (NTI), financial market volatility (FMV), financial depth (FD), past inflation 
(PI), unemployment rate (UR), normalized transparency index squared (NTI2) 
 
 R-squared values are still relatively low, though higher than for the output volatility 
models. The regressors for each model are jointly statistically significant based on the p-values 
of the overall F statistic. As with the pooled output volatility OLS regressions, these results are 
very preliminary. There are numerous variables in the equations that are either the incorrect sign 
or statistically insignificant, which is to be expected as the model is misspecified. These pooled 
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regressions ignore country-specific effects of panel data; we explore more complex models in 
order to try and capture the true data relationship. 
 The Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier test strongly implies the presence of 
heteroskedasticity for both of the above pooled OLS models. Therefore heteroskedastically 
robust standard errors are presented, which improve the statistical significance of some of the 
parameter estimates.  
Model Comparison of Financial Market Volatility Pooled OLS with  
Heteroskedastically Robust Errors 
 (1) (2) 
 FMV FMV 
NTI -1.0529*** -2.6051* 
 (0.2732) (1.1410) 
   
FD -0.0134 -0.0132 
 (0.0122) (0.0123) 
   
PI 0.4547*** 0.4531*** 
 (0.0559) (0.0570) 
   
UR -0.1609 -0.1501 
 (0.1038) (0.1058) 
   
NTI2  0.1418 
  (0.0981) 
   
_cons 30.2028*** 33.7952*** 
 (3.0452) (3.9794) 
N 598 598 
r2 0.1498 0.1521 
F 
pvalue 
30.4298 
0.0000 
23.5467 
0.0000 
ll -2378.3890 -2377.5569 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Note: normalized transparency index (NTI), financial market volatility (FMV), financial depth (FD), past inflation 
(PI), unemployment rate (UR), normalized transparency index squared (NTI2) 
 
 While more of the parameter estimates are now statistically significant, pooled OLS 
ignores many important features of the data. In order to begin considering the data as a panel, the 
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models are estimated under FE and RE.  
Model Comparison of Financial Market Volatility Fixed Effects and  
Random Effects with Heteroskedastic Robust Errors 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 FMV (FE) FMV (FE) FMV (RE) FMV (RE) 
NTI -1.6637* -6.1984* -1.4032* -5.3180* 
 (0.6481) (2.6617) (0.5489) (2.2546) 
     
FD 0.0232 0.0146 0.0035 -0.0004 
 (0.0376) (0.0376) (0.0256) (0.0266) 
     
PI 0.2859** 0.2673* 0.3107*** 0.2961** 
 (0.0983) (0.1066) (0.0910) (0.0974) 
     
UR 0.4578 0.4256 0.1985 0.2096 
 (0.4534) (0.4411) (0.2873) (0.2826) 
     
NTI2  0.4248  0.3655* 
  (0.2124)  (0.1806) 
     
_cons 26.4897*** 37.9773** 28.0556*** 37.4024*** 
 (7.5728) (11.1381) (7.0973) (9.7286) 
N 
Within r2 
Between r2 
Overall r2 
F 
pvalue 
Wald chi2 
pvalue 
598 
0.0867 
0.0464 
0.0833 
11.57 
0.0000 
 
 
598 
0.0990 
0.0444 
0.0889 
7.28 
0.0000 
 
 
598 
0.0830 
0.0905 
0.1217 
 
 
64.72 
0.0000 
598 
0.0960 
0.0770 
0.1198 
 
 
50.08 
0.0000 
ll -2180.3288 -2176.2979   
sigma_u 10.9860 10.9976 9.7004 9.8118 
sigma_e 9.8221 9.7652 9.8221 9.7652 
rho 0.5558 0.5591 0.4938 0.5024 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Note: normalized transparency index (NTI), financial market volatility (FMV), financial depth (FD), past inflation 
(PI), unemployment rate (UR), normalized transparency index squared (NTI2) 
 
The above estimations are a vast improvement compared to the earlier output volatility estimates. 
Most of the coefficients are in line with theory, and some of the parameters are also statistically 
significant. However, full analysis should wait until after the endogeneity problem is addressed.  
 As theory suggested, the Hausman test on both model comparisons supports the rejection 
85 
of the null hypothesis that RE provides consistent estimates. Therefore the analysis presented 
proceeds focusing only on FE models. 
 As with output volatility, before adjusting the model for endogeneity it is important to 
confirm that there is indeed a problem. Below is the IV estimation for an exactly identified 
model of financial market volatility. The first-stage regression of the endogenous variable 
(normalized transparency index) is run on all of the exogenous variables, which in this case 
means financial depth, past inflation, unemployment rate, and rule of law. Our IV, rule of law, is 
highly statistically significant. The second part of the output, shown below, reports the results of 
interest from the IV regression of financial market volatility on the normalized transparency 
index as well as the other exogenous regressors. Normalized transparency has a large effect 
economically and is highly statistically significant. Compared to the earlier pooled OLS 
regression on financial market volatility, this is a much more statistically significant model.  
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IV Regression for Financial Market Volatility with Heteroskedastic Robust Errors 
 (1) 
 FMV 
NTI -2.6252*** 
 (0.5402) 
  
FD -0.0058 
 (0.0132) 
  
PI 0.3616*** 
 (0.0665) 
  
UR -0.2097 
 (0.1165) 
  
_cons 38.6861*** 
 (4.2561) 
N 517 
r2 
F 
pvalue 
0.3231 
68.67 
0.0000 
Wald chi2           93.72 
pvalue 0.0000 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Note: normalized transparency index (NTI), financial market volatility (FMV), financial depth (FD), past inflation 
(PI), unemployment rate (UR) 
 
 Comparing our initial pooled OLS regressions with the above estimates, it is clear that 
the coefficient on NTI becomes much more economically significant after the inclusion of an IV 
(-1.052943 compared to -2.625236). The loss of precision from utilizing IV is also visible by the 
increase in the standard errors (0.27318856 to 0.5401943). The Durbin-Wu-Hausman test leads 
to the strong rejection of the null hypothesis that NTI is exogenous; it is safe to conclude that the 
normalized transparency index is endogenous and the use of IV is appropriate.  
 Thus far, the analysis has shown that the model does suffer from endogeneity and FE 
estimation is preferred to RE. Estimations are now extended into an initial model to consider 
both FE and IV simultaneously.  
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Instrumental Variable Fixed Effects Panel Model Comparison of Financial Market Volatility 
 (1) (2) 
 FMV FMV 
NTI -8.4129 -16.5013 
 (6.4750) (23.4364) 
   
FD 0.1671 0.1261 
 (0.1249) (0.0796) 
   
PI 0.0111 0.0383 
 (0.2348) (0.1831) 
   
UR 0.0288 0.0498 
 (0.4377) (0.3886) 
   
NTI2  0.8778 
  (1.9827) 
   
_cons 56.2753 73.9230 
 (29.9291) (64.6061) 
N 
Wald chi2 
pvalue 
517 
2413.03 
0.0000 
517 
2662.43 
0.0000 
sigma_u 17.6717 15.9230 
sigma_e 11.3912 10.8467 
rho 0.7065 0.6830 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Note: normalized transparency index (NTI), financial market volatility (FMV), financial depth (FD), past inflation 
(PI), unemployment rate (UR), normalized transparency index squared (NTI2) 
 
The rule of law is used as an instrument for the normalized transparency index while financial 
depth squared is used as an instrument for the normalized transparency index squared. The 
results here are more promising than similar output volatility results previously reported. All of 
the parameter estimates have the correct sign and the small p-value from the test concludes that 
at least one of the regression coefficients is not equal to zero in each model. Interpreting the 
second regression, the estimates imply that financial market volatility decreases by 16.5013 for 
each additional unit increase of transparency, though the coefficient is statistically insignificant 
and slightly large in value to be entirely plausible. Estimates also suggest that volatility will 
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decrease to a minimum at a value of 9.3992 level of transparency [= 16.5013 / (2 x 0.8778)], 
after which financial market volatility may begin to increase. Although these results are very 
superficial, it is striking that this suggested level of optimum transparency is much higher for 
minimizing financial market volatility than it was for minimizing output volatility.  
 When the models are estimated with the original, non-normalized transparency index the 
potential minimum points increase once again as they did when output volatility was the main 
concern.  
Instrumental Variable Fixed Effects Panel Model Comparison of Financial Market Volatility 
with Original Transparency Index 
 (1) (2) 
 FMV FMV 
TI -5.2218 -9.1525 
 (4.0190) (12.1245) 
   
FD 0.1671 0.1261 
 (0.1249) (0.0796) 
   
PI 0.0111 0.0383 
 (0.2348) (0.1831) 
   
UR 0.0288 0.0498 
 (0.4377) (0.3886) 
   
TI2  0.3382 
  (0.7639) 
   
_cons 47.8623* 58.2995 
 (23.5325) (43.3284) 
N 
Wald chi2 
pvalue 
517 
2413.03 
0.0000 
517 
2662.43 
0.0000 
sigma_u 17.6717 15.9230 
sigma_e 11.3912 10.8467 
rho 0.7065 0.6830 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Note: transparency index (TI), financial market volatility (FMV), financial depth (FD), past inflation (PI), 
unemployment rate (UR), transparency index squared (TI2) 
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Here the estimates of the second regression imply that financial market volatility decreases by 
9.1525 for each additional unit increase of transparency, though the coefficient is statistically 
insignificant. Estimates also suggest that volatility will decrease to a minimum at a value of 
13.5312 level of transparency [= 9.1525 / (2 x 0.3382)], after which financial market volatility 
may begin to increase; this possible minimum point is substantially larger in value than the 
minima found when output volatility was considered.  
 As with the early output volatility models, the coefficient estimates are no longer 
statistically significant. The standard errors are much larger than with previous estimates; the IV 
regression leads to a substantial loss in estimator efficiency here. There may be a problem with 
the IV chosen; it is therefore imperative to consider the Arellano-Bond estimator, which uses 
lags of the dependent variable to identify the model. 
 Below are the 2SLS estimates for financial market volatility. Each model strongly rejects 
the presence of serial correlation, therefore the estimations are consistent. Lags of financial 
market volatility, normalized transparency, and, where applicable, normalized transparency 
squared are used to identify the model and control for endogeneity. 
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2SLS Arellano-Bond Model Comparison of Financial Market Volatility with 
Heteroskedastic Robust Errors 
 
 (1) (2) 
 FMV FMV 
NTI -0.7164 -2.7359 
 (1.8168) (4.7763) 
   
FD 0.1953**** 0.1161**** 
 (0.0558) (0.0335) 
   
PI 0.2990*** 0.3302*** 
 (0.1153) (0.1250) 
   
UR 0.4182* 0.3816 
 (0.2423) (0.2340) 
   
NTI2  0.3383 
  (0.4265) 
   
_cons 0.5098 5.7989 
 (8.9490) (14.5992) 
N 428 428 
Wald chi2 139.31 140.23 
pvalue 0.0000 0.0000 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001 
Note: normalized transparency index (NTI), financial market volatility (FMV), financial depth (FD), past inflation 
(PI), unemployment rate (UR), normalized transparency index squared (NTI2) 
 
The coefficients on the estimated parameters are all the correct sign, while none of the pertinent 
regressors are statistically significant. All of the corresponding Wald test statistics indicate very 
strong significance for these one-step models. 
 The two-step, GMM model is now considered and estimates are presented below. The 
first model strongly rejects the presence of serial correlation; therefore the estimations are 
consistent, though the most relevant coefficients are not statistically significant. However there is 
strong serial correlation present in the second, squared term model. As theory suggests, 
additional lags were added to mitigate the presence of serial correlation; however, there was little 
or no effect in eliminating the correlation.  
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 Another way of controlling for serial correlation would be to use the Arellano and Bover 
(1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) estimation. Arellano-Bond uses IV estimator(s) under the 
assumption that lags of the endogenous variable can be used as instruments in the first 
differenced equation, for which E(yisΔυit) = 0 for s ≤ t – 2 is a necessary assumption as well. 
However, Arellano-Bover and Blundell-Bond suggest using additional moment conditions for 
estimators with improved precision. Both estimators use the additional condition that E(Δyi,t-1υit) 
= 0 to include levels of the original equation and use Δyi,t-1 as an appropriate instrument. 
Moreover, with the Arellano-Bover and Blundell-Bond estimators, additional moment conditions 
can be utilized for endogenous and predetermined variables by using their first-differences as 
instruments.  
 Using the Arellano-Bover and Blundell-Bond estimators eliminates the problem of serial 
correlation and also reduces most of the standard errors on the estimated coefficients.  
As with the 2SLS estimations, lags of financial market volatility, normalized transparency, and, 
where applicable, normalized transparency squared are used to identify the model and control for 
endogeneity. Coefficients on the estimated parameters are all the anticipated signs (aside from 
the control variable unemployment rate, which switches signs based on the estimated model). All 
of the Wald test statistics indicate very strong significance for all of the models.  
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GMM Arellano-Bond and Arellano-Boyer / Blundell-Bond Model Comparison of  
Financial Market Volatility with Heteroskedastic Robust Errors 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 FMV-AB FMV-AB FMV-AB/BB FMV-AB/BB 
NTI -0.7434 -2.4710 -1.0348 -1.3134 
 (1.7471) (6.3600) (0.8357) (6.2495) 
     
FD 0.1968**** 0.1227 0.0613 0.0283 
 (0.0529) (0.2384) (0.0528) (0.0530) 
     
PI 0.3009*** 0.3344 0.2365 0.2795 
 (0.1165) (0.9925) (0.2301) (0.2775) 
     
UR 0.4287* 0.3754 -0.1753 -0.2178 
 (0.2572) (3.6879) (0.5508) (0.4845) 
     
NTI2  0.3156  0.0677 
  (0.5681)  (0.5590) 
     
_cons 0.4748 4.7551 12.8472 14.8035 
 (8.7831) (23.3124) (10.0104) (17.9644) 
N 428 428 490 490 
Wald chi2 127.23 86.67 157.36 105.75 
pvalue 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001 
Note: normalized transparency index (NTI), financial market volatility (FMV), financial depth (FD), past inflation 
(PI), unemployment rate (UR), normalized transparency index squared (NTI2) 
 
 Considering each variable on its own, the control variables (past inflation, financial depth 
and unemployment rate) are usually not statistically significant. However, their inclusion in the 
model allows for more appropriate specification. The coefficients on the normalized 
transparency index variables are negative for both models, indicating that as the level of 
transparency increases output volatility will decrease. As predicted, the coefficients on the 
squared normalized transparency index variables are positive for both models, suggesting that 
there could be diminishing returns to transparency.  
 While the important estimated coefficients all have the anticipated signs, it is striking that 
none of these estimated effects are statistically significant. The above results imply that there 
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may be diminishing returns to transparency’s effect on financial market volatility as there was 
with output volatility; however, since the estimated crucial coefficients of the model are not 
significant it would be imprudent to draw too many conclusions. GMM estimations appear to 
have captured the correct models for output volatility, but results for financial market volatility 
GMM estimators are insignificant. Additional tests were performed, including adding previous 
financial market volatility as an exogenous variable and as a variable with lags; however these 
variables were of course dropped from estimations due to multicollinearity with the existing lags 
of the dependent variable. In fact, the most appropriately fitted model for financial market 
volatility appears to be the simple pooled IV OLS regression that was performed earlier. This 
simple model ignores many important characteristics of the richness of panel data and simply 
pools all of the observations and includes an IV to account for endogeneity.  
 In conclusion, due to the imprecise estimates from the 2SLS and GMM dynamic panels, 
it is pragmatic to conclude that while there may exist the hypothesized relationship between 
central bank transparency and financial market volatility it is not accurately nor significantly 
captured given the data. There are many reasons why the relationship could be obscured. For 
instance, effects on financial market volatility may be based on only some forms of central bank 
transparency and not all five sub-indices that are included in the data. Financial market volatility 
might mainly be affected by procedural transparency (i.e. accounts of policy deliberations, 
disclosure of voting records) and policy transparency (i.e. disclosure of policy decisions, 
indications of future policy actions) and not the other three types of transparency. The 
relationship between procedural and policy transparency may be obfuscated by the inclusion of 
the other three irrelevant types of central bank transparency, which would muddle the results. 
Unfortunately this theory is not testable as the sub-indices data is unavailable. Another reason 
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could be that there is a relationship between transparency and financial market volatility, but that 
the relationship is not as apparent in annual data. Central bank transparency may strongly affect 
financial market volatility on certain days or even weeks; however, the annualized data used in 
this study may not put enough weight on these volatile days. Times of relative calm in financial 
markets might overwhelm the annualized data and mitigate any brief tumultuous periods. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
95 
iii. Additional Results 
 
 The richness of the data supplied by Dincer and Eichengreen (2013) allows research over 
a 13-year period. It is of interest, however, to consider the period before the financial crisis and 
see if the GMM output volatility models predict the same relationship. Below are the same 
ultimate output volatility models presented earlier for a data range of 1998 – 2006. 
GMM Arellano-Bond Model Comparison of Output Volatility from 1998 – 2006 with 
Heteroskedastic Robust Errors 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 OV3 OV5 OV3 OV5 
NTI -0.4390** -0.3763* -0.2321 -0.1172 
 (0.2094) (0.1955) (0.3365) (0.3274) 
     
FD -0.0086 0.0016 -0.0062 -0.0055 
 (0.0120) (0.0070) (0.0120) (0.0079) 
     
PI 0.0012 -0.0050 -0.0037 -0.0032 
 (0.0103) (0.0062) (0.0082) (0.0067) 
     
NTI2   -0.0124 -0.0059 
   (0.0318) (0.0308) 
     
_cons 3.3643**** 1.9442*** 2.5621*** 1.5626* 
 (0.9208) (0.7205) (0.8371) (0.8146) 
N 632 634 632 634 
Wald chi2 67.44 19.16 116.51 61.93 
pvalue 0.0000 0.0018 0.0000 0.0000 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001 
Note: normalized transparency index (NTI), three-year output volatility (OV3), five-year output volatility (OV5), 
financial depth (FD), past inflation (PI), normalized transparency index squared (NTI2) 
 
 While all models reject the presence of serial correlation, the Wald Chi-Square statistics 
have dropped in comparison to the same models that utilized the full data set. Moreover, some 
signs of the coefficients have changed and while others are no longer statistically significant. The 
coefficient on normalized transparency index is still negative, indicating an inverse relationship 
between the level of transparency and output volatility. Noteworthy, in particular, is that the 
coefficients on the squared transparency term are now negative, though they are also 
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insignificant. This may imply that in times of relative stability (i.e. from 1998 – 2006) that 
additional information coming from central banks has no limitations or diminishing effects. If 
this is true, it would support the theory highlighted in the introduction that transparency could 
have smoothing effects in calm periods while it has volatile or panic inducing effects in times of 
economic turmoil. If central banks release a plethora of information while animal spirits exist, 
the combination of the two factors could exacerbate the economic climate, which could lead to 
greater volatility in periods of crisis.  
 Given the economic and political climate both during and after the financial crisis of 
2007 – 2010 it would be understandable if central banks decreased their level of transparency. 
Looking at the effect of the financial crisis on transparency levels, it is notable that most central 
banks maintained or increased their level of transparency during this time period. There are only 
two countries that exhibit a decrease in transparency immediately after the crisis: Uruguay and 
Sri Lanka.  
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 Considering the relationship between output volatility and central bank transparency 
during the financial crisis is more difficult to examine as a dynamic panel due to the four-year 
data limitation. Instead, output volatility during 2007 – 2010 is explored with pooled OLS and 
pooled IV OLS regressions. The results are mainly suggestive, but very interesting. The 
difference in the measures of output volatility for three years versus five years is the most 
distinct in the following regressions.  
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Pooled OLS and Pooled IV OLS Model Comparison of Output Volatility from 2007 – 2010 with 
Heteroskedastic Robust Errors 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 REGOV3 REGOV5 IVREGOV3 IVREGOV5 
NTI 0.5064** 0.1098 4.5167** -2.3565 
 (0.2484) (0.2598) (1.7898) (3.3957) 
     
NTI2 -0.0387* -0.0113 -0.3621** 0.2186 
 (0.0215) (0.0236) (0.1503) (0.2882) 
     
FD -0.0020 -0.0015 -0.0095** -0.0011 
 (0.0026) (0.0033) (0.0041) (0.0053) 
     
PI 0.0557** 0.1119 0.0809*** 0.1179 
 (0.0237) (0.0778) (0.0292) (0.0760) 
     
_cons 0.7893 1.9183** -9.1315** 7.3816 
 (0.5244) (0.8479) (4.3280) (8.1121) 
N 429 429 429 429 
Wald chi2   13.47 10.40 
pvalue 
r2 
F 
pvalue 
 
0.0296 
3.03 
0.0296 
 
0.0654 
3.55 
0.0074 
0.0092 0.0343 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001 
Note: normalized transparency index (NTI), three-year output volatility (OV3), five-year output volatility (OV5), 
financial depth (FD), past inflation (PI), normalized transparency index squared (NTI2) 
 
 Aside from the fourth model, the coefficients on normalized transparency are now 
positive whereas the coefficients on transparency squared are now negative, both the opposite of 
what was originally hypothesized. This should not come as a surprise, however. Since the above 
models focus on the relationship between output volatility and transparency during the financial 
crisis, the coefficients are in line with the proposed theory that information released from banks 
could exacerbate volatility. In times of tranquil market conditions, one would expect the opposite 
relationship. However, in times of turmoil, there could be larger, often panicked or negative, 
reactions to information released from central banks. So while initially the results above seem 
inconsistent, they actually support the hypothesis proposed by this research.  
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 One final important point to draw attention to is the difference in estimates for both 
pooled OLS and pooled IV OLS when the dependent variable changes from three-year output 
volatility to five-year output volatility. Not only do the estimates on transparency and 
transparency squared lose significance, but the estimated coefficients also change signs when 
three-year output volatility is modeled compared to five-year output volatility. As the only 
change in the model comparison is the number of previous years considered when calculating 
output’s volatility, it demonstrates the distinction in the results based on the chosen measure of 
the dependent variable. Examining the fourth model, pooled IV OLS with five-year output 
volatility as the dependent variable, provides estimates that are more consistent with the 
hypothesized overall relationship between transparency and output volatility. This may be 
because volatility is measured over the current year and four previous years instead of the current 
year and two previous years. If a period of tranquility is followed by a period of turmoil, using 
the five-year output volatility measure will pull more placid years into the calculated variable 
and therefore weigh less volatile output growth over a longer period than the three-year output 
measure would.  
 Similarly developed countries are now considered to investigate potential relationships. 
This decreases the sample size even more than when the data were split into pre- and post-crisis 
years; results should be interpreted with caution and are mainly suggestive. Less developed 
countries (LDC) do not have much variation in the data and are therefore not considered with 
regressions; however, preliminary analysis supported the original relationship implications that 
were presented in the general Output Model section.  
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 Countries that fall under the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) are now considered. Due to the much smaller sample size, panel data models are not 
considered since the number of instruments in each estimation approach the sample size.  
Pooled OLS and Pooled IV OLS Model Comparison of Output Volatility from 1998 – 2010 for 
OECD Countries with Heteroskedastic Robust Errors 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 OV3 OV5 OV3IV OV5IV 
NTI 0.4039 0.5236* 2.2077 2.2582 
 (0.3158) (0.3025) (2.2919) (2.3245) 
     
NTI2 -0.0272 -0.0394* -0.1866 -0.2034 
 (0.0233) (0.0221) (0.1642) (0.1681) 
     
FD -0.0007 -0.0021 0.0003 0.0001 
 (0.0017) (0.0015) (0.0048) (0.0048) 
     
PI 0.0507**** 0.0572**** 0.0469** 0.0535*** 
 (0.0119) (0.0086) (0.0217) (0.0189) 
     
_cons -0.0533 0.0994 -4.6170 -3.8655 
 (1.0222) (0.9767) (7.3038) (7.3484) 
N 278 278 234 234 
Wald chi2 
pvalue 
r2 
F 
 
 
0.1019 
5.18 
 
 
0.1496 
15.02 
21.73 
0.0002 
70.77 
0.0000 
pvalue 0.0005 0.0000   
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001 
Note: normalized transparency index (NTI), three-year output volatility (OV3), five-year output volatility (OV5), 
financial depth (FD), past inflation (PI), normalized transparency index squared (NTI2) 
 
While the panel data models are not displayed here, they all exhibited similar coefficient 
estimations as above. The key difference between these estimated coefficients and the 
coefficients estimated for all 120 countries is that the signs on transparency and squared 
transparency have switched. The suggested relationship for OECD countries, while not 
statistically significant, is that transparency increases volatility up to a certain point. It then 
diminishes and at a certain point starts to mitigate volatility. While this relationship at first may 
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seem incongruous, it does coincide with most OECD countries having a very high level of 
central bank transparency. Regressions are run for G20 countries below, which yield similar 
suggestive results to the results displayed for OECD countries.  
Pooled OLS and Pooled IV OLS Model Comparison of Output Volatility from 1998 – 2010 for 
G20 Countries with Heteroskedastic Robust Errors 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 OV3 OV5 OV3IV OV5IV 
NTI 0.0058 0.1666 5.8934 1.5381 
 (0.2379) (0.2450) (32.9151) (20.4570) 
     
NTI2 -0.0135 -0.0351 -0.5550 -0.1658 
 (0.0231) (0.0239) (2.9894) (1.8561) 
     
FD -0.0001 -0.0033* -0.0010 -0.0021 
 (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0156) (0.0093) 
     
PI 0.0545**** 0.0491**** 0.0454 0.0473** 
 (0.0123) (0.0095) (0.0465) (0.0228) 
     
_cons 1.7601**** 2.3479**** -11.6522 -0.7827 
 (0.5084) (0.4931) (75.3781) (47.0049) 
N 217 217 183 183 
Wald chi2 
pvalue 
r2 
F 
 
 
0.2206 
9.16 
 
 
0.2701 
19.66 
13.54 
0.0089 
 
 
78.77 
0.0000 
 
pvalue 0.0000 0.0000   
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001 
Note: normalized transparency index (NTI), three-year output volatility (OV3), five-year output volatility (OV5), 
financial depth (FD), past inflation (PI), normalized transparency index squared (NTI2) 
 
 The above models also support a theory earlier expounded in the Output Model portion of 
this section. The final specified GMM models of output volatility for both three and five years 
and utilizing the normalized transparency index found that an optimal level of transparency 
might exist at 4.33 or 4.17 respectively depending on the number of years provided in the output 
volatility estimate. At the time this result seemed rather low, especially given the high levels of 
non-normalized transparency exhibited by many developed countries. However, if one considers 
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only the most developed countries then, given supporting evidence from the above estimated 
OECD and G20 models, it may be the case that the more developed a country is that the more 
information its central bank needs to release before it reaches a point where the level of 
transparency reduces volatility levels.  
Finally, financial market volatility is explored once more by focusing solely on G20 
countries to see if these preliminary regressions are comparable to the earlier regressions in the 
Financial Market Model section.  
Pooled OLS and Pooled IV OLS Model Comparison of Financial Market Volatility from 1998 – 
2010 for G20 Countries with Heteroskedastic Robust Errors 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 FMV FMV FMVIV FMVIV 
NTI -1.8547**** -2.0731 -3.0122**** -12.0673 
 (0.4127) (2.2964) (0.6047) (43.0462) 
     
FD -0.0016 -0.0019 0.0251 0.0285 
 (0.0115) (0.0113) (0.0162) (0.0268) 
     
PI 0.4724**** 0.4729**** 0.4306**** 0.4319**** 
 (0.0654) (0.0664) (0.0791) (0.1041) 
     
UR 0.1464 0.1478 0.1813 0.2675 
 (0.1295) (0.1350) (0.1385) (0.4640) 
     
NTI2  0.0222  0.8262 
  (0.2056)  (3.9025) 
     
_cons 32.6452**** 33.0852**** 36.3864**** 56.6149 
 (2.7881) (5.6873) (3.1775) (96.2267) 
N 201 201 169 169 
Wald chi2   79.50 83.50 
pvalue 
r2 
F 
pvalue 
 
0.4139 
22.81 
0.0000 
 
0.4139 
22.35 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.3559 
 
0.0000 
0.2459 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001 
Note: normalized transparency index (NTI), financial market volatility (FMV), financial depth (FD), past inflation 
(PI), unemployment rate (UR), normalized transparency index squared (NTI2) 
 
As with output volatility, the data is too limited to properly consider dynamic panel models and 
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the analysis is limited to pooled OLS and pooled IV OLS models. While the above models do 
not take advantage of the characteristics of panel data, the pooled estimates provide a glimpse of 
the relationship between transparency levels and financial market volatility for G20 countries. 
Though not all of the coefficients are significant and some of the standard errors are particularly 
large, the implied relationship of all the models is what was originally hypothesized. The level of 
transparency is inversely related to financial market volatility and there appears to be a 
diminishing return to transparency since the coefficient attached to the squared transparency term 
is positive.  
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VI. Summary and Concluding Remarks 
 This research aims to make a contribution to the central bank transparency literature by 
examining the effect of transparency levels on output and financial market volatility. The most 
thorough transparency index available is utilized in the analysis in order to capture as many 
central banks as possible. This research does not make any normative judgments about the 
benefits or drawbacks to transparency; this is important research nonetheless and is worth 
pursuing.     
 The most promising results from this study are found in the analysis of central bank 
transparency on output volatility. Utilizing the entire data set, the Arellano-Bond GMM 
estimators for output volatility over a three- and five-year periods supported the initial 
hypotheses that an increase in the level of central bank transparency will decrease output 
volatility up until a certain point, where after this point additional information from central banks 
begins to exacerbate output volatility. An interesting result is suggested, however, when 
considering the same relationship on a subset of the most developed countries. When examining 
OECD and G20 countries, the opposite relationship is potentially highlighted; output volatility 
seems to increase as central bank transparency increases up until a maximum point where it then 
potentially begins to mitigate volatility. This result may help explain why many developed 
central banks have higher levels of transparency compared to the rest of the world. An optimal 
level of central bank transparency may exist, but this specific level may differ depending on the 
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status of economic development demonstrated by each country or group of countries. Additional 
research in this area could help explain why countries’ central banks choose certain amounts of 
transparency.  
 Results from the models exploring the relationship between financial market volatility 
and central bank transparency were equally as promising and supported the initial hypotheses, 
though they were not statistically significant. Similar to the output volatility results, dynamic 
GMM panel models demonstrated a decrease in financial market volatility up until a certain 
point at which an increase in central bank transparency would then exacerbate volatility rather 
than mitigate it. However, more research, and potentially a different measure of financial market 
volatility, is needed before any concrete conclusions can be drawn.  
 In order to compare the relationship between volatility and transparency in times of calm 
versus turmoil, the subset periods of 1998 – 2006 and 2007 – 2010 were also considered to see if 
output volatility’s relationship with transparency differed for these periods compared to the full 
data set of 1998 – 2010. The results for 1998 – 2006 suggested that in times of relative economic 
tranquility that additional information provided by central banks has no diminishing effects and 
continually decreases volatility. Comparing this result to the full model estimates for the period 
1998 – 2010 supports the theory that transparency may have smoothing effects in calm periods 
while it has more volatile effects during economic or financial crises. An examination of the data 
for 2007 – 2010 provides further evidence. Most models for this time period indicated that an 
increase in transparency could instead increase output volatility rather than mitigate it.  
Finally, given the aforementioned relationship uncovered, brief descriptive analysis was 
conducted to look at the pre- and post-crisis levels of transparency to see if any central banks 
moved towards opacity after the financial crisis of 2007-2010. Somewhat surprisingly, however, 
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only two of the 120 central banks in the study demonstrated a decrease in transparency after the 
crisis. Central bank transparency may not be as fleeting a notion as its critics claim.  
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VIII. Appendices 
Data Appendix: Index Description, reproduced from Dincer and Eichengreen (2009)  
The index is the sum of the scores for answers to the 15 questions below (min = 0, max = 15). 
1. Political Transparency 
Political transparency refers to openness about policy objectives. This comprises a formal 
statement of objectives, including an explicit prioritization in case of multiple goals, a 
quantification of the primary objective(s), and explicit institutional arrangements. 
(a) Is there a formal statement of the objective(s) of monetary policy, with an explicit 
prioritization in case of multiple objectives? 
No formal objective(s) = 0. 
Multiple objectives without prioritization = 1/2. 
One primary objective, or multiple objectives with explicit priority = 1. 
(b) Is there a quantification of the primary objective(s)? 
No = 0. 
Yes = 1. 
(c) Are there explicit contacts or other similar institutional arrangements between the monetary 
authorities and the government? 
No central bank contracts or other institutional arrangements = 0. 
Central bank without explicit instrument independence or contract = 1/2. 
Central bank with explicit instrument independence or central bank contract although possibly 
subject to an explicit override procedure = 1. 
2. Economic Transparency 
Economic transparency focuses on the economic information that is used for monetary policy. 
This includes economic data, the model of the economy that the central bank employs to 
construct forecasts or evaluate the impact of its decisions, and the internal forecasts (model based 
or judgmental) that the central bank relies on. 
(a) Is the basic economic data relevant for the conduct of monetary policy publicly available? 
(The focus is on the following five variables: money supply, inflation, GDP, unemployment rate 
and capacity utilization.) 
Quarterly time series for at most two out of the five variables = 0. 
Quarterly time series for three or four out of the five variables = 1/2. 
Quarterly time series for all five variables = 1. 
(b) Does the central bank disclose the macroeconomic model(s) it uses for policy analysis? 
No = 0. 
Yes = 1. 
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(c) Does the central bank regularly publish its own macroeconomic forecasts? 
No numerical central bank forecasts for inflation and output = 0. 
Numerical central bank forecasts for inflation and/or output published at less than quarterly 
frequency = 1/2. 
Quarterly numerical central bank forecasts for inflation and output for the medium term (one to 
two years ahead), specifying the assumptions about the policy instrument (conditional or 
unconditional forecasts) = 1. 
3. Procedural Transparency 
Procedural transparency is about the way monetary policy decisions are taken. 
(a) Does the central bank provide an explicit policy rule or strategy that describes its monetary 
policy framework? 
No = 0. 
Yes = 1. 
(b) Does the central bank give a comprehensive account of policy deliberations (or explanations 
in case of a single central banker) within a reasonable amount of time? 
No or only after a substantial lag (more than eight weeks) = 0. 
Yes, comprehensive minutes (although not necessarily verbatim or attributed) or explanations (in 
case of a single central banker), including a discussion of backward and forward-looking 
arguments = 1. 
(c) Does the central bank disclose how each decision on the level of its main operating 
instrument or target was reached? 
No voting records, or only after substantial lag (more than eight weeks) = 0. 
Non-attributed voting records = 1/2. 
Individual voting records, or decision by single central banker = 1. 
4. Policy Transparency 
Policy transparency means prompt disclosure of policy decisions, together with an explanation of 
the decision, and an explicit policy inclination or indication of likely future policy actions. 
(a) Are decisions about adjustments to the main operating instrument or target announced 
promptly? 
No or only after the day of implementation = 0. 
Yes, on the day of implementation = 1. 
(b) Does the central bank provide an explanation when it announces policy decisions? 
No = 0. 
Yes, when policy decisions change, or only superficially = 1/2. 
Yes, always and including forwarding-looking assessments = 1. 
(c) Does the central bank disclose an explicit policy inclination after every policy meeting or an 
explicit indication of likely future policy actions (at least quarterly)? 
No = 0. 
Yes = 1. 
5. Operational Transparency 
Operational transparency concerns the implementation of the central bank’s policy actions. It 
involves a discussion of control errors in achieving operating targets and (unanticipated) 
macroeconomic disturbances that affect the transmission of monetary policy. Furthermore, the 
evaluation of the macroeconomic outcomes of monetary policy in light of its objectives is 
included here as well. 
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(a) Does the central bank regularly evaluate to what extent its main policy operating targets (if 
any) have been achieved? 
No, or not very often (at less than annual frequency) = 0. 
Yes, but without providing explanations for significant deviations = 1/2. 
Yes, accounting for significant deviations from target (if any); or, (nearly) perfect control over 
main operating instrument/target = 1. 
(b) Does the central bank regularly provide information on (unanticipated) macroeconomic 
disturbances that affect the policy transmission process? 
No, or not very often = 0. 
Yes, but only through short-term forecasts or analysis of current macroeconomic developments 
(at least quarterly) = 1/2. 
Yes, including a discussion of past forecast errors (at least annually) = 1. 
(c) Does the central bank regularly provide an evaluation of the policy outcome in light of its 
macroeconomic objectives? 
No, or not very often (at less than annual frequency) = 0. 
Yes, but superficially = 1/2. 
Yes, with an explicit account of the contribution of monetary policy in meeting the objectives = 
1. 
 
Output volatility is measured as the standard deviation of the growth rate over the most recent 
three-year period (the current calendar year and its two immediate predecessors) and the most 
recent five-year period (the current calendar year and its four immediate predecessors). The 
annual percentage growth rate of GDP is measured at market prices based on constant local 
currency. Aggregates are based on constant 2005 US dollars. GDP is the sum of gross value 
added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies 
not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for 
depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources. Data is 
provided by the World Bank.  
 
Financial depth and stock market volatility measurements utilize the following data source: The 
World Bank’s Global Financial Development Database (GFDD), updated November 2013.  
 
Financial depth is measured as M2/GDP; the data is taken from the GFDD as well as Data 
Market. Money and quasi money consist of the sum of currency outside banks, demand deposits 
other than those of the central government, and the time, savings, and foreign currency deposits 
of resident sectors other than the central government.  
 
Past inflation is measured as the previous period’s inflation. Inflation is measured by the 
consumer price index and reflects the annual percentage change in the cost to the average 
consumer of acquiring a basket of goods and services that may be fixed or changed at specified 
intervals, usually yearly. Data is provided by the World Bank.  
 
The volatility of the stock price index is the 360-day standard deviation of the return on the 
national stock market index. The data is taken from the GFDD via Bloomberg.  
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Unemployment rate is measured as the percentage of the labor force actively seeking 
employment over the total labor force and is sourced from the World Bank and the IMF.  
 
Rule of law is taken from the World Bank Worldwide Governance Indictors. Rule of law 
captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of 
society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the 
courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. Estimate gives the country’s score on the 
aggregate indicator, in units of a standard normal distribution, ranging from approximately -2.5 
to 2.5. 
 
East Caribbean refers to Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, Saint Kitts and 
Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent, and the Grenadines. 
 
European Union refers to countries within Europe who have adopted the Euro and fall under the 
jurisdiction of the European Central Bank.  
 
Table 1: Dincer and Eichengreen’s Transparency Index (0 is least transparent and 15 is most 
transparent) 
 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Africa 2.4 2.4 2.6 2.9 3.1 3.3 3.5 3.8 3.9 4.2 4.4 4.5 4.4 
Eastern Africa 2.1 2.1 2.3 2.6 2.9 2.9 3.1 3.3 3.5 3.7 3.8 4.0 3.8 
Ethiopia 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 2.0 2.5 
Kenya 2.5 2.5 3.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.5 6.0 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.0 
Malawi 1.0 1.0 1.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 2.0 
Mauritius 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.5 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 
Mozambique 4.0 4.0 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 5.0 6.0 5.0 
Rwanda 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 2.0 2.0 2.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 
Seychelles 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 3.5 3.5 3.5 
Tanzania 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 
Uganda 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 
Zambia 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 
Northern Africa 1.5 1.5 1.8 1.8 2.1 2.3 2.4 2.8 3.3 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.6 
Egypt 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.5 2.0 3.5 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Sudan 1.0 1.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 
Tunisia 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 5.0 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 
Middle Africa 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Angola 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Southern Africa 3.8 3.9 4.4 5.0 5.3 5.5 6.0 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.3 7.0 
Botswana 5.0 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 
Lesotho 2.0 2.0 2.5 2.5 2.5 3.5 3.5 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 
Namibia 3.0 3.0 3.5 3.5 4.5 4.5 6.0 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 8.5 7.5 
South Africa 5.0 5.0 6.0 8.5 8.5 8.5 8.5 8.5 8.5 8.5 8.5 8.5 8.5 
Western Africa 3.7 3.7 3.7 4.0 4.3 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.8 5.5 6.7 6.7 6.7 
Ghana 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 4.0 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 6.5 7.0 7.0 7.0 
Nigeria 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 5.0 6.5 6.5 6.5 
Sierra Leone 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 5.0 6.5 6.5 6.5 
 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Americas 3.8 4.0 4.2 4.5 4.7 4.9 5.3 5.3 5.4 5.4 5.3 5.4 5.4 
Latin America and the 2.4 2.5 2.6 3.0 3.3 3.4 3.6 3.7 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.6 
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Caribbean 
East Caribbean 3.0 3.0 3.5 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 
Aruba 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 1.0 1.0 
Bahamas 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 
Barbados 2.5 3.0 3.0 3.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 3.5 3.5 3.5 
Cayman Islands 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Cuba 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 
Curacao 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 
Jamaica 3.0 3.0 3.0 4.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 
Trinidad and Tobago 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.5 5.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 
Central America 2.5 2.5 2.5 3.0 3.1 3.3 4.4 4.4 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.8 
Belize 2.0 2.0 2.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 
El Salvador 2.0 2.0 2.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 
Guatemala 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 2.0 2.0 5.5 5.5 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.0 
Mexico 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 5.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 
South America 3.4 3.8 4.5 4.9 5.3 5.6 5.7 5.7 5.6 5.4 5.3 5.5 5.8 
Argentina 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 4.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 
Brazil 3.5 5.5 9.0 9.0 9.0 9.0 9.0 9.0 8.0 6.5 6.0 6.0 8.5 
Chile 7.0 7.0 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 8.5 8.5 
Colombia 2.5 3.5 5.0 5.0 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 8.5 8.0 7.5 7.0 
Guyana 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 
Peru 5.0 5.0 5.0 6.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 8.5 8.5 
Uruguay 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 
Venezuela 1.0 1.0 1.0 2.5 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 
Northern America 6.7 7.2 7.2 7.2 7.2 7.2 7.3 7.3 7.7 7.7 7.7 7.7 7.7 
Bermuda 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Canada 10.5 10.5 10.5 10.5 10.5 10.5 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 
United States 8.5 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 
 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Asia 2.8 3.0 3.3 3.5 3.9 4.2 4.4 4.7 4.9 5.0 5.1 5.0 5.1 
Central Asia 2.7 2.7 2.7 3.0 3.0 2.7 3.3 4.5 4.5 4.7 4.7 4.7 4.7 
Kazakhstan 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 
Kyrgyzstan 3.0 3.0 3.0 4.0 4.0 3.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 
Tajikistan 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 
Eastern Asia 4.3 4.4 4.8 4.9 5.3 6.1 6.3 6.3 6.3 6.3 6.7 6.7 6.7 
China 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 
Hong Kong 5.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 
Korea 6.5 6.5 8.0 8.5 8.5 8.5 8.5 8.5 8.5 8.5 8.5 8.5 8.5 
Japan 8.0 8.0 8.5 8.0 8.0 8.0 9.5 9.5 9.0 9.0 10.5 10.5 10.5 
Macao 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 
Mongolia 2.0 2.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 
Southern Asia 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.5 2.9 3.3 3.4 3.4 3.9 3.9 3.9 3.6 3.9 
Bangladesh 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.5 3.0 3.5 3.5 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 
Bhutan 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 4.5 
India 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 
Iran 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 
Maldives 2.5 2.5 2.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 
Pakistan 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 
Sri Lanka 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 6.5 6.5 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.0 5.5 5.5 
South-Eastern Asia 2.5 3.1 4.1 4.3 5.0 5.6 5.8 5.9 6.0 5.9 5.9 6.0 6.2 
Cambodia 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 
Indonesia 3.0 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 7.0 8.0 8.0 8.5 8.5 8.5 8.5 9.0 
Lao People’s 
Democratic 0.0 0.0 1.5 1.0 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 
Malaysia 4.5 4.5 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 
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Philippines 3.5 5.0 5.0 6.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 9.0 9.0 9.0 10.0 
Singapore 2.5 4.0 4.0 4.0 3.0 4.5 4.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 
Thailand 2.0 2.0 6.0 6.5 8.0 8.0 8.0 8.0 8.0 8.0 8.5 9.0 9.0 
Western Asia 2.5 2.3 2.5 2.9 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.9 4.1 4.2 4.2 4.3 
Armenia 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 8.5 
Azerbaijan 1.0 1.0 1.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 
Bahrain 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.5 3.5 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 
Cyprus 2.5 3.5 3.5 4.5 7.0 7.0 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 11.0 11.0 11.0 
Georgia 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.5 5.5 6.5 7.5 7.5 
Iraq 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 
Israel 5.5 7.0 7.5 8.5 8.5 8.5 8.5 8.5 10.0 10.0 11.0 11.0 11.5 
Jordan 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.0 2.5 2.5 2.5 1.5 
Kuwait 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 
Lebanon 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 
Oman 1.5 1.5 2.0 2.0 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 3.0 3.0 3.0 
Qatar 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 
Saudi Arabia 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 
Syria 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
Turkey 3.0 2.0 4.0 5.5 8.5 8.5 8.5 8.5 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 
United Arab Emirates 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 
Yemen 1.0 1.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 
 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Europe 5.3 5.6 6.0 6.4 7.0 7.4 7.7 7.8 8.0 8.1 8.1 8.3 8.4 
Eastern Europe 3.5 4.0 4.4 4.7 5.6 5.7 6.3 6.6 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.3 7.6 
Belarus 1.5 3.5 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 
Bulgaria 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 5.0 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 
Czech Republic 8.5 9.5 9.5 9.5 10.0 11.0 11.5 11.5 11.5 11.5 12 12 12 
Hungary 3.5 3.5 5.5 6.5 9.0 9.0 9.0 10.5 11.0 12.0 13.5 13.5 13.5 
Poland 3.0 5.0 5.0 6.5 6.5 6.5 7.0 8.0 9.0 10.0 9.0 9.0 9.0 
Republic of Moldova 5.0 5.0 5.0 6.0 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 7.0 7.0 8.0 
Romania 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 4.5 4.5 7.0 7.0 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 
Russian Federation 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 
Slovakia 4.0 4.0 4.5 3.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 6.0 8.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 
Ukraine 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 5.0 
Northern Europe 6.6 6.8 7.4 7.7 8.1 8.3 8.3 8.4 8.9 9.1 9.3 9.4 9.6 
Denmark 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 7.5 8.0 8.0 8.0 
Estonia 5.0 5.0 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.0 5.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 
Iceland 5.5 5.5 7.0 7.0 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 8.0 8.0 8.0 10.5 10.5 
Latvia 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.5 7.5 7.5 8.5 8.5 8.5 8.0 9.0 
Lithuania 4.0 4.0 4.5 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.5 5.5 6.0 6.0 6.0 
Norway 6.0 6.0 6.0 7.5 7.5 7.5 8.0 8.0 9.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 
Sweden 9.0 9.5 11.5 11.5 14.5 14.5 14.5 14.5 14.5 14.5 14.5 14.5 14.5 
United Kingdom 11.0 12.0 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.0 12.0 
Southern Europe 3.7 3.7 4.0 4.3 5.0 5.9 6.0 6.0 6.0 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.8 
Albania 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 6.0 6.5 6.5 6.5 8.0 8.0 8.0 8.0 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 
Croatia 1.5 1.5 1.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 
Macedonia 3.0 3.0 4.5 5.0 6.5 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.0 
Malta 5.0 5.0 5.5 5.5 5.5 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 
Slovenia 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 
Western Europe 7.3 7.8 8.0 9.0 9.3 9.8 10.3 10.3 10.3 10.3 10.3 10.8 10.8 
Switzerland 6.0 7.0 7.5 8.0 8.0 9.0 9.5 9.5 9.5 9.5 9.5 10.5 10.5 
European Union 8.5 8.5 8.5 10.0 10.5 10.5 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 
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 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Oceania 4.0 4.4 4.4 4.7 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.8 5.8 5.8 
Australia and New 
Zealand 9.3 10.5 10.5 10.8 11.5 11.5 11.5 11.5 11.5 11.5 12.5 12.5 12.5 
Australia 8.0 8.0 8.0 8.0 9.0 9.0 9.0 9.0 9.0 9.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 
New Zealand 10.5 13.0 13.0 13.5 14.0 14.0 14.0 14.0 14.0 14.0 14.0 14.0 14.0 
Melanesia 1.5 1.5 1.5 2.1 2.3 2.4 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.5 
Fiji 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 2.0 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 
Papua New Guinea 1.5 1.5 1.5 3.0 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 
Solomon Islands 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 
Vanuatu 1.5 1.5 1.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 2.5 
Polynesia 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.5 1.8 1.8 1.8 2.0 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 
Samoa 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 
Tonga 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
 
Table 2: Dincer and Eichengreen’s Weighted Transparency Index 
 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Africa 3.05 3.03 3.39 4.18 4.32 4.92 5.23 5.40 5.48 5.60 5.65 5.69 5.80 
Eastern Africa 2.03 2.09 2.28 2.57 2.99 3.01 3.01 3.18 3.48 3.75 3.69 3.81 3.82 
Northern Africa  1.37 1.37 1.41 1.43 1.76 2.21 2.59 3.44 4.39 4.66 4.65 4.70 4.69 
Middle Africa 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Southern Africa 4.94 4.96 5.89 8.19 8.31 8.23 8.30 8.36 8.36 8.36 8.34 8.39 8.36 
Western Africa 3.81 3.82 3.90 4.35 4.45 4.60 4.59 4.59 4.62 5.19 6.56 6.57 6.57 
Americas 7.73 9.16 9.33 9.35 9.48 9.53 9.60 9.56 10.23 10.07 9.91 9.95 10.05 
Latin America 
and Caribbean 3.27 3.33 3.33 3.85 4.67 4.71 5.29 5.72 5.44 5.47 5.48 5.40 5.38 
Central America 4.30 4.33 4.35 4.38 4.39 4.87 5.92 5.92 5.97 5.97 5.97 5.97 5.98 
South America 3.25 4.22 6.11 6.14 7.11 7.42 7.52 7.57 7.02 6.39 6.01 6.05 7.49 
North America 8.63 10.03 10.03 10.03 10.03 10.04 10.08 10.08 11.00 11.00 11.00 11.00 11.00 
Asia 5.54 5.70 6.19 5.80 5.92 6.52 7.15 6.98 6.79 6.47 6.87 6.80 6.73 
Central Asia 3.36 3.35 3.38 3.44 3.44 3.38 3.48 5.83 5.85 5.87 5.86 5.84 5.86 
Eastern Asia 6.48 6.58 7.02 6.46 6.47 7.16 8.04 7.89 7.42 6.99 7.47 7.35 7.23 
Southern Asia 1.92 1.92 1.92 1.96 2.01 2.18 2.21 2.21 3.15 3.13 3.16 3.12 3.11 
South-East Asia 2.95 3.87 5.04 5.28 5.98 7.02 7.34 7.48 7.70 7.58 7.70 7.82 8.19 
Western Asia 2.71 2.54 3.29 3.86 4.82 5.05 5.09 4.93 5.55 5.85 6.01 6.08 6.18 
Europe 8.34 8.59 8.69 9.80 10.25 10.28 10.69 10.62 10.58 10.57 10.45 10.50 10.43 
Eastern Europe 2.78 3.71 3.63 4.04 4.53 4.55 5.38 5.54 5.61 5.76 5.62 5.83 5.67 
Northern Europe 9.84 10.61 11.21 11.32 11.65 11.72 11.76 11.70 11.80 11.96 11.92 11.58 11.62 
Southern Europe 2.34 2.44 2.70 3.28 3.45 4.03 4.08 4.07 3.53 3.71 3.75 3.76 3.77 
Western Europe 8.43 8.46 8.47 9.94 10.43 10.46 10.96 10.96 10.96 10.96 10.96 10.99 10.98 
Oceania 8.20 8.54 8.46 8.59 9.62 9.69 9.64 9.62 9.56 9.60 11.23 11.23 11.23 
Australia and 
New Zealand 8.30 8.64 8.55 8.67 9.71 9.78 9.72 9.70 9.64 9.68 11.33 11.34 11.33 
Melanesia 1.50 1.50 1.50 2.40 2.65 2.81 3.01 3.04 3.06 3.06 3.10 3.13 3.13 
Polynesia 1.34 1.31 1.35 1.39 1.67 1.98 2.03 2.03 2.32 2.59 2.55 2.57 2.56 
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Table 3:  Murdzhev and Tomljanovich (2006) and Tomljanovich’s (2007) Timetable of Selected 
Countries and Central Bank Transparency Shifts  
 
Country Date Nature of Change 
Australia 8/1996 Formalization of inflation-targeting framework. 
Canada 2/1991 Inflation targets first announced. 
 7/1994 50 basis point operating band for overnight rate announced. 
 2/1996 Announcement of official overnight rate target. Press release whenever change 
in band occurs, including explanation for change. 
Germany - None for time-period studied. 
Japan 4/1998 Central bank granted operational independence through Bank of Japan Act; 
this was accompanied by major shift in transparency. 
New Zealand 1/1989 Adoption of inflation targeting, via Reserve Act of 1989.  Operational 
independence also granted through Act. 
Sweden 1/1993 Adoption of inflation targeting framework. 
United Kingdom 10/1992 Explicit inflation target announced. Also, minutes of policy meetings released 
within six weeks. 
 5/1997 Bank of England Act, establishing operational independence. Immediate 
disclosure of policy decisions. 
 6/1998 Minutes of policy meetings released within 15 days. 
United States 2/1994 Target announcements made on day of FOMC meeting. Release of minutes 
(six week delay), transcripts (five-year delay). 
 1/2000 Slight revision to language used in public statement following FOMC 
meetings. No more ‘neutral bias’, etc. 
 12/2004 Release of minutes accelerated to three-week delay following FOMC 
meetings. 
 
Table 4: Swanson (2006) Highlighted Changes in FOMC Transparency, 1990 – 2003 
 
Date FOMC Transparency Change 
March 2002 Begins releasing votes of individual Committee members and preferred policy choices of any 
dissenters 
October 2001 Chairman Greenspan delivers a speech highlighting FOMC’s moves toward greater transparency 
January 2000 Replaces “tilt” with statement describing “balance of risks” to economic outlook 
May 1999 Begins announcing policy “tilt” indicating most likely future interest rate action 
May 1999 Begins releasing statement about economic outlook even after no change in federal funds rate 
target 
1994-2003 Gradual shifts to longer, more descriptive press releases after FOMC decisions 
August 1994 Begins describing state of economy and more detailed rationale for policy action after FOMC 
decisions 
February 1994 Begins explicitly announcing changes in federal funds rate target and rationale for policy action 
November 
1993 
Begins releasing transcripts of FOMC meetings (with five-year lag) 
March 1993 Begins releasing minutes of FOMC meetings (with six-eight week lag) 
1992-2000 Gradually shifts policy actions to regularly scheduled meeting dates 
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Table 5: Summary of Output Volatility (3yr) 
 
 
 
Table 6: Summary of Output Volatility (5yr) 
 
99%      12.0033       36.17792       Kurtosis       53.73974
95%     6.357056       35.87794       Skewness       5.443117
90%     4.420524       31.11283       Variance       7.041868
75%      2.81859       21.77712
                        Largest       Std. Dev.      2.653652
50%     1.516512                      Mean           2.213046
25%     .7559222              0       Sum of Wgt.        1520
10%     .4155731              0       Obs                1520
 5%     .2825442              0
 1%     .0924937              0
      Percentiles      Smallest
                                                             
                        OutputVol3yr
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Table 7: Summary of Financial Market Volatility 
 
 
 
Table 8: Summary of Normalized Transparency Index 
 
99%     11.65715       30.71081       Kurtosis       35.14156
95%     7.572837       29.12179       Skewness       4.603489
90%     5.321388       28.73524       Variance       8.806084
75%     3.468867       28.68752
                        Largest       Std. Dev.      2.967505
50%     1.965599                      Mean           2.802425
25%     1.229714              0       Sum of Wgt.        1525
10%     .7492891              0       Obs                1525
 5%     .5041845              0
 1%     .2496493              0
      Percentiles      Smallest
                                                             
                        OutputVol5yr
99%       81.548       141.5828       Kurtosis       19.89223
95%     47.62304       127.6435       Skewness       3.014972
90%     39.92401       121.3643       Variance       189.6373
75%     29.06802       95.46481
                        Largest       Std. Dev.      13.77089
50%     22.34265                      Mean           24.78227
25%     16.12151       6.057586       Sum of Wgt.         707
10%     12.10873       5.286853       Obs                 707
 5%     10.37338       4.897316
 1%     7.457788       2.393469
      Percentiles      Smallest
                                                             
                          FinMktVol
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Table 9: Summary of Financial Depth 
 
 
 
99%     9.689655             10       Kurtosis       3.200155
95%     7.827586             10       Skewness       .8454788
90%     6.586207             10       Variance        3.67394
75%     5.034483             10
                        Largest       Std. Dev.      1.916752
50%     3.482759                      Mean           3.927188
25%     2.551724              1       Sum of Wgt.        1560
10%     1.931034              1       Obs                1560
 5%      1.62069              1
 1%            1              1
      Percentiles      Smallest
                                                             
                       NormTransIndex
99%      238.556       325.3392       Kurtosis       8.152568
95%     155.4763       324.4374       Skewness       2.016886
90%      124.055       299.6048       Variance       2169.936
75%     75.71412       297.3588
                        Largest       Std. Dev.      46.58257
50%      48.9179                      Mean           61.81856
25%       31.661       7.865406       Sum of Wgt.        1482
10%     19.91758       7.444931       Obs                1482
 5%     16.21111       7.079881
 1%     10.57166       6.723815
      Percentiles      Smallest
                                                             
                          FinDepth
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Table 10: Summary of Past Inflation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 11: Summary of Unemployment Rate 
 
 
 
Table 12: Summary of Rule of Law 
 
99%     85.73324       1058.374       Kurtosis       668.2765
95%     23.43543       324.9969       Skewness        22.8761
90%     15.05015       293.6788       Variance       1145.204
75%     9.016831       248.1959
                        Largest       Std. Dev.      33.84087
50%     4.708091                      Mean           9.163403
25%     2.237703      -8.813938       Sum of Wgt.        1412
10%     .6993596      -9.616154       Obs                1412
 5%    -.2856663      -9.797647
 1%    -2.637336      -10.06749
      Percentiles      Smallest
                                                             
                        PastInflation
99%         32.4           38.4       Kurtosis       7.182487
95%         21.9           37.6       Skewness       1.776141
90%         16.2           37.3       Variance       38.91142
75%         11.5           37.2
                        Largest       Std. Dev.      6.237902
50%         7.69                      Mean           9.061958
25%          4.8             .4       Sum of Wgt.        1097
10%          3.1             .3       Obs                1097
 5%            2             .3
 1%            1             .1
      Percentiles      Smallest
                                                             
                        UnemployRate
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Figure 1: Geraats (2002) provides a visual of the theoretical framework of the content and 
context of information disclosure: 
 
 
Figure 2: 
 
99%     1.945328        1.99964       Kurtosis       2.147094
95%     1.776184       1.987512       Skewness        .315838
90%      1.48567        1.98432       Variance       .8708505
75%     .7547212       1.974424
                        Largest       Std. Dev.      .9331937
50%    -.0357404                      Mean            .067564
25%    -.6913216      -1.790619       Sum of Wgt.        1305
10%    -1.059531      -1.843243       Obs                1305
 5%    -1.244672      -1.887967
 1%    -1.605873      -1.923883
      Percentiles      Smallest
                                                             
                           RuleLaw
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Figure 3: 
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 This research utilizes the seminal index from Dincer and Eichengreen (2013), which 
includes values for 120 countries from 1998 to 2010, to examine the effects of the level of 
central bank transparency on output and financial market volatility. In addition, this paper 
explores whether a degree of optimal transparency exists.  
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